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ABSTRACT—Information privacy is in trouble. Contemporary information
privacy protections emphasize individuals’ control over their own personal
information. But machine learning, the leading form of artificial intelligence,
facilitates an inference economy that pushes this protective approach past its
breaking point. Machine learning provides pathways to use data and make
probabilistic predictions—inferences—that are inadequately addressed by
the current regime. For one, seemingly innocuous or irrelevant data can
generate machine learning insights, making it impossible for an individual
to anticipate what kinds of data warrant protection. Moreover, it is possible
to aggregate myriad individuals’ data within machine learning models,
identify patterns, and then apply the patterns to make inferences about other
people who may or may not be part of the original dataset. The inferential
pathways created by such models shift away from “your” data and towards
a new category of “information that might be about you.” And because our
law assumes that privacy is about personal, identifiable information, we miss
the privacy interests implicated when aggregated data that is neither personal
nor identifiable can be used to make inferences about you, me, and others.
This Article contends that accounting for the power and peril of
inferences requires reframing information privacy governance as a network
of organizational relationships to manage—not merely a set of dataflows to
constrain. The status quo magnifies the power of organizations that collect
and process data, while disempowering the people who provide data and who
are affected by data-driven decisions. It ignores the triangular relationship
among collectors, processors, and people and, in particular, disregards the
codependencies between organizations that collect data and organizations
that process data to draw inferences. It is past time to rework the structure of
our regulatory protections. This Article provides a framework to move
forward. Accounting for organizational relationships reveals new sites for
regulatory intervention and offers a more auspicious strategy to contend with
the impact of data on human lives in our inference economy.
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INTRODUCTION
Information privacy is in trouble. Not because it’s dead.1 Not because
people claim they have “nothing to hide” and do not care about it.2
Information privacy is in trouble because the American protective regime
relies on individual control over data, and machine learning (ML) stretches
its underlying assumptions past their breaking point.3 Imagine that your
neighbor uploaded photographs of your housewarming party in 2010 on a
social media site and “tagged” you. Several years later, a private company
scrapes photographs of thousands of people from social media sites to build

1 See Polly Sprenger, Sun on Privacy: ‘Get Over It!,’ WIRED (Jan. 26, 1999, 12:00 PM),
https://www.wired.com/1999/01/sun-on-privacy-get-over-it [https://perma.cc/6359-NK6Q]; Judith
Rauhofer, Privacy Is Dead, Get Over It! Information Privacy and the Dream of a Risk-Free Society,
17 INFO. & COMMC’NS TECH. L. 185, 196 n.1 (2008) (reporting the origin of the quote).
2 See Ignacio N. Cofone, Nothing to Hide, but Something to Lose, 70 U. TORONTO L.J. 64, 64–65
(2020) (discussing the errors in the “nothing to hide” argument against privacy); Daniel J. Solove, “I’ve
Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745, 764–72
(2007) (critiquing the “nothing to hide” response to surveillance and data mining).
3 Here, and throughout this Article, I focus on the U.S. regulatory regime and use the term
“information privacy” to refer to the “consumer protection” understanding that dominates American law,
and which focuses on how private entities may collect and use personal data. The Fourth Amendment
controls government data collection and use in America. See Fourth Amendment, EPIC.ORG,
https://epic.org/issues/privacy-laws/fourth-amendment
[https://perma.cc/R9K4-AHSU].
Europe’s
regime, by contrast, adopts a “data protection” model that controls both public and private use of data and
“proceed[s] from the principle that data protection is a fundamental human right.” Anupam Chander,
Margot E. Kaminski & William McGeveran, Catalyzing Privacy Law, 105 MINN. L. REV. 1733, 1747
(2021). Because my focus is on the American regime, and because “data protection” and “data
governance” are terms of art in international law that are not yet widely accepted in American law, I use
the more general term “information privacy.” For further description of differences between the two
regimes, see id. at 1747–49. Moreover, unless otherwise indicated, I use the terms “data privacy” and
“information privacy” synonymously.
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a facial recognition tool.4 The private company uses one of the photos from
the party and, thanks to ML, generates a “faceprint” that makes it possible to
take any other photo associated with you, online or offline, predict that it
matches the faceprint in those other photos, and associate it with your name
as well as any other public details about your identity. Your ability to move
anonymously about the world is erased.5 Nor are the effects limited to you.
A decade after the party, a guest who happens to appear in the background
of the photo is identified and arrested by a police officer as a suspect for a
crime, even though that guest has never been to the state where the crime
was committed.6
Despite the prospect of such a far-reaching impact on individuals who
use platform services as well as the friends, family, and acquaintances who
interact with them, there are no open-and-shut violations of information
privacy regulations on the books here. Information privacy protections
today, especially in the United States, center on individual control over
personal information as a way to promote individual autonomy.7 The
4

Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We Know It, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
2, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html
[https://perma.cc/4HXU-9MLM].
5 Others have offered trenchant critiques of facial recognition tools. For an accessible critique of
facial recognition technology, see Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Facial Recognition Is the Perfect
Tool for Oppression, MEDIUM (Aug. 2, 2018), https://medium.com/s/story/facial-recognition-is-theperfect-tool-for-oppression-bc2a08f0fe66 [https://perma.cc/9KTU-5VB4] (calling facial recognition “the
most uniquely dangerous surveillance mechanism ever invented”); and Jonathan Zittrain, A World
Without
Privacy
Will
Revive
the
Masquerade,
ATLANTIC
(Feb
7,
2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2020/02/we-may-have-no-privacy-things-can-alwaysget-worse/606250 [https://perma.cc/WT79-Y2MK] (detailing how surveillance technology erodes
privacy rights and asserting that law should intervene because “[f]unctional anonymity is as valuable in
commerce as in speech”). This Article is distinct in its use of facial recognition as a leading example of
how ML data analytics affect the relationship between individuals and entities in ways that information
privacy law has not adequately recognized.
6 See Dave Gershgorn, Black Teen Barred from Skating Rink by Inaccurate Facial Recognition,
VERGE (July 15, 2021, 2:37 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2021/7/15/22578801/black-teen-skatingrink-inaccurate-facial-recognition [https://perma.cc/P5GR-C2R6] (discussing the incorrect identification
of a teenage girl who had never before visited the location); see also Kashmir Hill, Wrongfully Accused
by an Algorithm, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/24/technology/facialrecognition-arrest.html [https://perma.cc/BT8U-DX6C] (discussing the faulty facial recognition match
and arrest of a Black man); Kashmir Hill, Your Face Is Not Your Own, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/03/18/magazine/facial-recognition-clearview-ai.html
[https://perma.cc/GG9Y-G594] (discussing the identification of a man in the background of
a photograph).
7 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Turning Privacy Inside Out, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 3 & n.3
(2019) (“Perhaps the dominant justification for privacy is that it promotes and protects individual
autonomy.” (citing BEATE RÖSSLER, THE VALUE OF PRIVACY (2d ed. 2018); Anita L. Allen, Coercing
Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 738–40 (1999))); ARI EZRA WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST:
INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN INFORMATION AGE 29–33 (2018) (discussing dominant literature on
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underlying assumption is that regulating access to one person’s data affords
control over what happens with respect to that person’s information privacy.
But this focus on individual control and personal data covers too little
because the category of information privacy is bigger than what is currently
protected by the letter of the law.8
Contemporary information privacy protections do not grapple with the
way that machine learning facilitates an inference economy in which
organizations use available data collected from individuals to generate
further information about both those individuals and about other people.9 The
inference economy trades in data through two central predictive pathways.
First, ML insights about an individual can be derived from aggregations of
seemingly innocuous data. When a collection of data that individuals may
not even have realized they were disclosing—such as publicly available
photographs or IP addresses—becomes a pathway to other information, it
becomes hard to predict which bits of data are significant.10 This result
disempowers individuals who seek to shield their personal data, yet can no
longer know what needs protecting.11
Second, developers can aggregate data about you to train a ML model
that is subsequently used to make predictions about other people. Machine
learning works by gathering many data points and identifying correlative
privacy as “autonomy, choice, and control”); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace,
52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1613 & n.15 (1999) (identifying “the traditional liberal understanding of
information privacy, which views privacy as a right to control the use of one’s personal data”).
8 Data privacy is a dynamic, rapidly changing domain. In summer 2022, after this article was
finalized for publication, Congress issued a discussion draft of a proposed omnibus federal privacy bill.
See Press Release, H. Comm. on Energy & Com., House and Senate Leaders Release Bipartisan
Discussion
Draft
of
Comprehensive
Data
Privacy
Bill
(June
3,
2022),
https://energycommerce.house.gov/newsroom/
press-releases/house-and-senate-leaders-release-bipartisan-discussion-draft-of [https://perma.cc/5K4XWAB5]. The analysis that follows does not discuss that draft.
9 I reserve further treatment of the inference economy and the manner in which it scrambles the prior
understanding of the relationship among data, information, and knowledge for future work. For an early
account of the relationship between information and knowledge, focused on profiling in the European
context, see Mireille Hildebrandt, Defining Profiling: A New Type of Knowledge?, in PROFILING THE
EUROPEAN CITIZEN: CROSS-DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 17, 29–30 (Mireille Hildebrandt & Serge
Gutwirth eds., 2008). In this piece, I introduce the term “inference economy” to help crystallize the
dynamics at stake for information privacy regulation today. See infra Part IV.
10 See Steven M. Bellovin, Renée M. Hutchins, Tony Jebara & Sebastian Zimmeck, When Enough
Is Enough: Location Tracking, Mosaic Theory, and Machine Learning, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 556,
558–59 (2014) (discussing ML’s ability to “make targeted personal predictions” from the
“‘bread crumbs’ of data generated by people,” such as cell phone location data); Catherine Dwyer,
The Inference Problem and Pervasive Computing 3–4 (Oct. 8, 2009) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1508513 [https://perma.cc/U8XC-RGJE] (offering that “[a]n inference
problem occurs when someone can combine clues and pieces of information to deduce confidential
information” and focusing on this concern in “pervasive computing systems”).
11 See infra Section II.A.
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patterns among the variables.12 Identification of these patterns is the
“learning” of machine learning. An organization or entity may use these
correlative patterns to classify data into groups. It then becomes possible to
probabilistically infer that other individual cases are like or unlike members
of the group such that a particular categorization does or doesn’t apply to a
third party who was not in the original dataset.13 This result disempowers
individuals about whom inferences are made, yet who have no control over
the data sources from which the inferential model is generated.14
ML thus exposes the need to recognize two categories of data: one,
personal data, and two, data that can be processed to make inferences about
persons. Information privacy law today targets only the former category.
Historically, statutes and regulations didn’t need to cover inference
generation because economic and technological limitations implicitly
protected against the kinds of privacy-invasive inferential predictions that
ML makes possible.15 In the past decade, however, that baseline has shifted:
the growing ease of data collection with ubiquitous sensing technologies,
combined with computing advances that permit processing at previously
unimagined speeds and scales, has opened new pathways for ML model
development. The consequences reach beyond the “surveillance capitalis[t]”
pressure to extract more data and process that “free raw material” into
behavioral data that is used for commercial gain.16 The corollary information
privacy issue is the fact that the cost of extraction is falling at the same time
that, thanks to ML, the potential future benefit of using the data is growing,
and the ability to anticipate or understand the present day or future
importance of a particular piece of data is diminishing.
12 David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn About
Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 671 (2017).
13 American law has largely failed to recognize the distinct challenges of these kinds of relationships
between individuals and unrelated third parties. See Salomé Viljoen, A Relational Theory of Data
Governance, 131 YALE L.J. 573, 613–16 (analyzing the “absence of horizontal data relations in datagovernance law”); see also JULIE E. COHEN, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. AT COLUM. UNIV., HOW (NOT)
TO WRITE A PRIVACY LAW 4, https://s3.amazonaws.com/kfai-documents/documents/306f33954a/
3.23.2021-Cohen.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3E9-PAGK] (critiquing privacy law’s reliance on “[a]tomistic,
post hoc assertions of individual control rights” that “cannot meaningfully discipline networked processes
that operate at scale”).
14 See infra Section II.B.
15 See infra Section II.B. I do not mean to suggest that this status quo was normatively ideal; rather,
I underscore how the technological state of the art interacted with the legal reality, as a practical matter.
16 Amy Kapczynski, The Law of Informational Capitalism, 129 YALE L.J. 1460, 1460, 1464 (2020)
(defining surveillance capitalism as organizational methods “that operate[] by ‘unilaterally claim[ing]
human experience as free raw material for translation into behavioral data,’ and processing that data to
‘anticipate what you will do now, soon, and later’” (quoting SHOSHANNA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF
SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER
8 (2019))).
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This combination of factors constitutes the “inference economy.” An
inference economy would not be possible without the animating forces of
surveillance capitalism and informational capitalism, which create
commercial incentives to amass data often entrenched by law.17 Yet this
phenomenon is distinct, too. The full force of the inference economy depends
on ML. Machine learning is a tool that, in application, changes the potential
future informational value of any particular bit of data. The term inference
economy underscores how ML generates information from bits of data. It
also highlights how this threat to information privacy protections runs in
parallel to surveillance capitalist concerns with platform firms’ manipulation
of user autonomy and preferences, as well as informational capitalism’s
concern with property law’s role in facilitating the exploitation of data.
Furthermore, focusing on the social and technological dynamics of ML
is useful both to better understand weaknesses in information privacy law’s
current approach and to forecast emerging strains on its protective regime.18
This analysis amplifies the insights of privacy law scholars who have
critiqued the current regulatory approach on many grounds, from attacking
the impossibility of providing meaningful consent in the face of complex,
lengthy agreements;19 to questioning the reliance on individual rights and
corporate compliance;20 to arguing that information privacy is relational and
not individualistic, in the sense that it is contingent on relationships between
individuals and large technology companies21 and among individuals
themselves;22 to contending that the traditional approach fails to account for

17 See ZUBOFF, supra note 16, at 8; JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL
CONSTRUCTIONS OF INFORMATION CAPITALISM 6 (2019).
18 I do not argue that ML is wholly unique or new in revealing these challenges; rather, my point is
that the social and technological dynamics of ML illuminate issues with particular force, to be taken
seriously here and now. Along with a coauthor, I have adopted a similar stance in prior work. See Richard
M. Re & Alicia Solow-Niederman, Developing Artificially Intelligent Justice, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
242, 247 (2019) (offering that the study of AI judging “sheds light on governance issues that are likely to
emerge more subtly or slowly elsewhere”); see also Aziz Z. Huq, Constitutional Rights in the MachineLearning State, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1875, 1885–86 (2020) (taking a similar stance).
19 See, e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg, N. Cameron Russell, Alexander J. Callen, Sophia Qasir & Thomas
B. Norton, Privacy Harms and the Effectiveness of the Notice and Choice Framework, 11 I/S: J.L. &
POL. INFO. SOC’Y 485, 490–95 (2015) (summarizing capacious literature criticizing the notice and
choice system).
20 See, e.g., Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy, Practice, and Performance, 110 CALIF. L. REV. 1221,
1225–26 (“[A]ll of [the privacy practices] are performative, and our acculturation to them has entrenched
them and defined our relationship to, and assumptions about, privacy law.”).
21 See, e.g., Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, A Relational Turn for Data Protection?, 4 EURO.
DATA PROT. L. REV. 493, 494 n.9 (2020) (compiling privacy law scholarship focused on relationships).
22 See, e.g., Solon Barocas & Karen Levy, Privacy Dependencies, 95 WASH. L. REV. 555, 557–58
(2020) (surveying how any one person’s privacy depends on decisions and disclosures made by
other people).
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the scale and nature of dataflows in the digital era.23 But these critical
scholarly insights have not grappled directly with the ways in which ML can
draw inferences from data and the incentives created by this potential use of
data. Nor have these critiques, in the main, translated to regulatory proposals
on the ground.
At present, the legislative proposals that are proliferating at the local,
state, and federal level offer solutions based on an understanding of the
information privacy problem that is at best incomplete. One stylized mode
of intervention centers on stronger statutory protection of an individual’s
rights with respect to their own data. Stronger rights might be part of a
regulatory package; however, individual rights to opt into or out of data
collection or subsequent uses won’t help if there are flaws in the individual
control model to begin with.24 Nor will the chance to opt into or out of data
collection address instances such as a private company that builds its own
facial recognition tool using images acquired from publicly accessible data.25
Another stylized mode of intervention bars or constrains the use of particular
kinds of technology, such as facial recognition bans or biometric regulations.
Moratoria and regulatory friction may be necessary to halt immediate
harms; however, they are not adaptive long-term responses and are likely to
create an endless game of legislative whack-a-mole to cover the latest
emerging technology.26
The regulatory options on the table are tactics. They operate within the
same paradigm as the long-standing protective regime, centered on
individual control. They are limited to expanding individual control or
addressing individual technologies. Missing, still, is a strategy that accounts
for who can do things with data.

23

See, e.g., Viljoen, supra note 13, at 581 (“The pursuit of user attention and uninterrupted access to
dataflows amplifies forms of identitarian polarization, aggression, and even violence. Such evidence
suggests that social processes of datafication not only produce violations of personal dignity or autonomy,
but also enact or amplify social inequality.”); COHEN, supra note 1716, at 6 (stating that “focusing . . .
on . . . divisions threatens to diminish the underlying transformative importance of the sociotechnical shift
to informationalism as a mode of development”).
24 See COHEN, supra note 13 (arguing that reliance on consent in contemporary privacy law proposals
is misguided).
25 Rachel Metz, Anyone Can Use This Powerful Facial-Recognition Tool — And That’s a Problem,
CNN (May 4, 2021, 3:53 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/05/04/tech/pimeyes-facialrecognition/index.html [https://perma.cc/6QDN-YLMG].
26 For instance, despite the debate surrounding facial recognition technology, there has been little
public attention to government use of other biometric technologies. See DAVID FREEMAN ENGSTROM,
DANIEL E. HO, CATHERINE M. SHARKEY & MARIANO-FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR, GOVERNMENT BY
ALGORITHM: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 6, 31–34 (2020)
(discussing U.S. Customs and Border Protection trials of iris recognition at land borders); see also infra
notes 195–198.
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Governing information privacy in the inference economy requires
addressing a distinct set of questions: which actors have the ability to
leverage the data available in the world, what incentives do those
organizations have, and who is potentially harmed or helped by their
inferences? Answering these questions requires targeting interventions to
account for the relationships between individuals and the entities that collect
and process data, not merely dataflows.27 Precise answers are imperative
because the products of the inference economy are not necessarily bad. ML
promises, at least in some settings, to unlock information that may help
individuals left unassisted by traditional methods, such as by broadening
access to medical interventions,28 or to allow greater insight into knotty social
problems, such as identifying discrimination.29 Yet it’s not always possible
to predict which bits of data from which sources might be used for outcomes
that retroactively seem good or bad. And it is nearly impossible for
individuals to manage and respond to inferential predictions.
To gain traction on these multifaceted challenges, this Article
emphasizes the importance of inferences for information privacy and
underscores the distinct position of organizations that draw inferences from
data. It identifies entities that collect data and entities that process that data
into further information as organizational actors that occupy unique positions

27 Other privacy scholars urge a “relational turn” in privacy law. See, e.g., Richards & Hartzog, supra
note 21, at 2 (stating that the relational turn in privacy law “looks at how the people who expose
themselves and the people that are inviting that disclosure relate to each other” and is “concerned with
what powerful parties owe to vulnerable parties not just with their personal information, but with the
things they see, the things they can click, the decisions that are made about them”). I share Neil Richards
and Woodrow Hartzog’s concern that homing in on data elides critical questions of power. Id. at 4. This
Article focuses on machine learning as a way to recenter the conversation. I contend that ML’s inference
economy increases the salience of organizational dynamics that have not, to date, received sustained
scholarly attention. See infra Section II.B, Part IV.
28
See, e.g., Andrew Myers, AI Expands the Reach of Clinical Trials, Broadening Access to More
Women, Minority, and Older Patients, STAN. UNIV. HUM.-CENTERED A.I. (Apr. 16, 2021),
https://hai.stanford.edu/news/ai-expands-reach-clinical-trials-broadening-access-more-women-minorityand-older-patients [https://perma.cc/9T5K-2V9C] (reporting the potential use of AI to generate more
inclusive clinical trial criteria); Tom Simonite, New Algorithms Could Reduce Racial Disparities in
Health Care, WIRED (Jan. 25, 2021, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/new-algorithms-reduceracial-disparities-health-care [https://perma.cc/M3NR-Z4VJ] (reporting how AI performed better than
doctors at identifying qualitative differences in MRI images of Black patients who reported knee pain).
29 See, e.g., Jon Kleinberg, Jens Ludwig, Sendhil Mullainathan & Cass R. Sunstein, Discrimination
in the Age of Algorithms, 10 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 113, 113 (2019) (suggesting algorithms can make it
easier to identify discrimination); see also W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, Clearing Opacity Through
Machine Learning, 106 IOWA L. REV. 775, 778 (2021) (suggesting that machine learning can help humans
to understand complex systems, such as biomedicine).
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of informational power today.30 This Article builds from the rich literature
on relationality in privacy to make a complementary point: an approach that
is attentive to the inference economy is not simply relational in the sense of
a particular relationship between an individual and a firm, nor in the sense
that my choices may affect your privacy; it is also relational in the sense of
the relationships between organizations that collect data and organizations
that process data to draw inferences, and how those organizations’ decisions
permit the application of ML models to make predictions about individuals.
These kinds of relational dynamics are more complex than what can be
represented in the contemporary, control-focused approach. That approach
is linear: it emphasizes dataflows between one person and one data collector.
We gain descriptive purchase and prescriptive specificity when dataflows
are instead situated as part of a triangle. Critically, a trilateral reframing
distinguishes the task of data collection from the task of information
processing and identifies which organization(s) are conducting each task.31
Furthermore, it provides space to acknowledge that individuals may act both
as subjects from whom data is collected and as objects to whom ML models
are subsequently applied. And it reveals relational dependencies that
represent new sites for potential interventions.
As one example, a facial recognition company such as Clearview AI
can be understood as an “information processor” that scrapes and analyzes
photographs obtained from “data collectors” such as Facebook, Venmo, and
Google. Rather than relying solely on regulation that bans an activity, such
as scraping photographs, or regulation that bans a technology, such as facial
recognition, this reframing opens up other regulatory paths that focus on the
nature of the relationship between the actors that handle data. Attention to
these relational dynamics suggests that we may need to regulate the conduct
of data collectors (here, Facebook, Google, and Venmo) in order to regulate

30

Scholars have previously suggested the importance of thinking about privacy regulation
functionally. For instance, Jack Balkin has coined the phrase “Great Chain of Privacy Being,” arguing
that we should categorize privacy regulations based on their place in the chain of “(1) collection of
information, (2) collation, (3) analysis, (4) use, (5) disclosure and distribution, (6) sale, and (7) retention
or destruction.” Jack M. Balkin, The Fiduciary Model of Privacy, 134 HARV. L. REV. F. 11, 30 (2020).
This Article is the first, to my knowledge, to argue that the activities of data collectors that amass data
and information processors that draw inferences from the data they access warrant particular attention,
see infra Section II.B, and to detail the institutional dynamics that arise by virtue of the relationship
among players at different stages of data handling, see infra Part IV.
31 I use the term “information processing” to refer to activities that transform data into new
information that goes beyond the original data itself. See infra Section IV.B (discussing the shift from
data collection to information processing). As used here, the term information processing is distinct from
the term processing as it appears in European Union data protection law. I adopt this distinct term for
conceptual specificity and reserve further study of EU law for future work.
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the conduct of information processors that lack a direct relationship to the
individuals whose data they collect and then use (here, Clearview AI).
This Article argues that we need a new strategic framework for
information privacy protection. It proceeds in four parts. Parts I and II
explain how contemporary American information privacy protections fail to
anticipate or guard against ML inferences and examine the consequences of
this state of affairs. Part I considers existing legal and regulatory protections,
with an emphasis on the role that control over personally identifiable data in
sensitive contexts plays in the protective regime. Part II brings in machine
learning, first assessing how the inferential capabilities of ML route around
the protections provided by the contemporary regime, and then evaluating
how particular technological and economic developments have facilitated
ML advances. Shifts in these economic and technological factors both
disrupt implicit information privacy protections and provide enhanced
inferential potential to firms and organizations with resources and incentives
to develop advanced data-processing models.
Parts III and IV maintain that recent attempts to update law to contend
with information privacy challenges advance solutions that do not engage
with a complete understanding of the problem. Part III evaluates leading
reform proposals, such as enhanced data protection laws and technological
bans. These proposals, it maintains, do not provide a strategy to engage with
the ways in which firms and organizations that generate ML inferences
from available data are able to amass an arsenal of informational power.
Part IV contends that a better strategy must account for the institutional
dynamics of the inference economy. Information privacy protections are
more productively understood with a triangular frame that reckons with
the distinct position and power of individuals, data collectors, and
information processors.32
Situating potential interventions within this triangular relationship is the
most auspicious strategy to harness machine learning’s inferential power on
behalf of human beings.

32 I am not the first to reconceptualize a linear relationship as a triangle or to suggest the payoff of a
trilateral framing. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech Is a Triangle, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2011, 2014–
15 (2012); Kristen E. Eichensehr, Digital Switzerlands, 167 U. PENN L. REV. 665, 703 & n.202 (2019)
(stating that “[t]he pattern of company challenges becomes clear when the cyberspace ecosystem is
understood as a triangle, composed of three separate power centers: governments, technology companies,
and users” and referencing other works that discuss similar triadic framings). This Article is the first, to
my knowledge, to situate the contemporary information privacy regulatory model in these terms.
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I.

THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY STATUS QUO

To set the stage for how and why ML strains the status quo, this Part
surveys the law as it stands and offers a brief summary of the “privacy-ascontrol” frame, centered on notice and choice, that guides U.S. information
privacy regulation. This regulatory approach emerges from a particular
understanding of what privacy is and what it requires. Long-standing
contestation about what privacy does or should mean notwithstanding,33 the
standard liberal understanding situates privacy as instrumental: it is
necessary to protect individual autonomy.34 Privacy is instrumental for
autonomy, at a minimum, in the thin sense of securing a person’s ability to
determine what information about them is public or nonpublic.35 A thicker
account of autonomy positions privacy as a social value: privacy affords
“breathing room” for self-determination, allowing an individual to form and
re-form the self as a social being over time.36 Thin or thick, this
understanding of privacy as essential for self-definition and selfdetermination pervades privacy law.37
In order to preserve space for individual autonomy, contemporary
information privacy law relies on control of information about the self.38
Elements of this understanding trace back to Louis Brandeis and Samuel
Warren’s foundational 1890 law review piece, The Right to Privacy, which
positioned privacy as the right “to be let alone.”39 Confronted with a new
technology, the camera, that captured intimate moments in individual lives
33 David E. Pozen, Privacy-Privacy Tradeoffs, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 221, 225 (2016); see Jeffrey Bellin,
Pure Privacy, 116 NW. U. L. REV. 463, 464–67 (2021).
34 See Cohen, supra note 7, at 3 & n.3; see also Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L.
REV. 1904, 1904–05 (2013) (discussing how “legal scholarship has conceptualized privacy as a form of
protection for the liberal self” and exposing the flaws of this line of thinking).
35 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 198 (1890)
(“The common law secures to each individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his
thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others.”).
36 Cohen, supra note 7, at 12–13; Mireille Hildebrandt, Privacy and Identity, in PRIVACY AND THE
CRIMINAL LAW 44 (Erik Claes, Antony Duff & Serge Gutwirth eds., 2006).
37 See Peter Galison & Martha Minow, Our Privacy, Ourselves in the Age of Technological
Intrusions, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’ 258 (Richard Ashby Wilson ed., 2005); Viljoen,
supra note 13, at 599–600. Salomé Viljoen notes that even for more “social” understandings of privacy
grounded in thicker accounts of autonomy, “the normative basis of these arguments remains individual
autonomy: datafication is wrongful, and harmful both for individuals and society, when it threatens the
capacity for individuals to develop and act on their self-will.” Id. at 602. I reserve the question of whether
this conceptualization is adequate or normatively desirable, and instead make a narrower descriptive point
about the version of privacy that has been most fully instantiated in American law for decades. See ALAN
F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) (developing privacy as value in terms of impact on
individual autonomy).
38 See Waldman, supra note 20 (manuscript at 26–29).
39 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 35, at 195 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 29 (2d ed. 1879)).
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and permitted popular dissemination of those snapshots in previously
impossible ways, Brandeis and Warren argued that society required new
protections.40 A privacy tort, in their view, “would secure for each person the
right to determine ‘to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions
shall be communicated to others.’”41 This understanding of privacy focuses
on preserving “a type of immunity or seclusion” for the individual.42
Nearly seventy years later, William Prosser structured emergent
common law formulations by enumerating four privacy torts intended to
protect “against emotional, reputational, and proprietary injuries.”43 These
torts, along with leading theoretical accounts of privacy as “limited access to
the self,” focus on an “individual’s desire for concealment and for being
apart from others.”44 Maintaining this form of privacy is possible only if an
individual has some ability to control the kinds of information that others can
access about them, thereby limiting what others can do to disturb that
individual.45 This understanding of privacy as control has dominated the
liberal understanding of information privacy for decades and is especially
foundational in American information privacy law.46
Controlling access to information about the self means one thing in the
village common; it means another in a globalized information age.
Information becomes not only about what travels through neighbors’
whisper networks, but also about what data is collected and compiled about
an individual through anonymous, computerized networks. A concern with
public and private entities’ growing use of “automated data systems
containing information about individuals” catalyzed a 1973 U.S. Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) report on Records, Computers,

40

Id. at 195–96.
Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805, 1807 (2010)
(quoting Warren & Brandeis, supra note 35, at 198).
42 Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1102 (2002).
43 Citron, supra note 41, at 1809. The four torts are public disclosure of private facts, intrusion on
seclusion, depiction of another in a false light, and appropriation of another’s image for commercial gain.
Id. (citing William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 422–23 (1960)).
44 Solove, supra note 42, at 1102–05.
45 See id. at 1110 (“The control-over-information can be viewed as a subset of the limited access
conception.”). I do not claim that privacy as “access” reduces to privacy as “control”; rather, by drawing
this connection, I highlight the deep roots of the privacy-as-control model that undergirds information
privacy, without contending that this model exhausts the universe of privacy interests. Notably, this
traditional telling omits important racial components, too. See Anita Allen, Address at Yale ISP Ideas
Lunch (May 13, 2021) (emphasizing racial and gender inequities in conceptions of privacy).
46 Solove, supra note 42, at 1109–10; Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and
the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1880 (2013).
41
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and the Rights of Citizens.47 The HEW report recommended protection of
individuals’ privacy interests through a proceduralized approach known as
“Fair Information Practices” (FIPs).48 This report recognized that individuals
might share data with organizations yet still retain some privacy interests in
that data.49 The Code of Fair Information Practices it proposed thus sought
“to both allow ‘some disclosure of data’ and afford affected individuals at
least some agency in deciding ‘the nature and extent of disclosure.’”50 These
principles, centered on individual control,51 made a massive impact on
privacy law across the world and ultimately set forth a general framework
for information privacy.52
In the United States, the FIPs never translated into an overarching,
generally applicable data governance statute.53 Instead, they were
operationalized through what William McGeveran has called a “consumer
protection regime” that “generally allows any collection and processing of
personal data, unless it is specifically forbidden.”54 This model emphasizes
individuals’ “notice” of, and “consent” to, the collection and use of their
data.55 The resulting “notice-and-choice” federal informational privacy
regime has two main parts that complement the common law and state
statutes: so-called “sectoral” statutes, and regulatory enforcement through
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).
First, sectoral statutes provide added protection in domains deemed
especially sensitive, such as personal health information, credit reporting and
47 ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERS. DATA SYS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. &
WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS, at viii (1973); see DANIEL J. SOLOVE
& PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY LAW FUNDAMENTALS 49 (2015).
48 Woodrow Hartzog, The Inadequate, Invaluable Fair Information Practices, 76 MD. L. REV. 952,
952, 956–57 (2017).
49 Margot E. Kaminski & Jennifer M. Urban, The Right to Contest AI, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 1957,
1995 (2021).
50 Id. (quoting ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERS. DATA SYS., supra note 47, at 39–40).
51 Hartzog, supra note 48, at 959–60 (characterizing FIPs as centered on “control over personal
information” and describing the impact of this “control” conceptualization).
52 Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization,
57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1734 (2010); see also Pam Dixon, A Brief Introduction to Fair Information
Practices, WORLD PRIV. F. (Dec. 19, 2007), https://www.worldprivacyforum.org/2008/01/report-a-briefintroduction-to-fair-information-practices [https://perma.cc/XW9C-MZT2] (describing FIPs and how
personal information data collection systems should be managed). For further detail on the history of the
FIPs, including the transition from the 1973 HEW report to formal adoption by the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development in 1980, see Hartzog, supra note 48, at 957–59.
53 A legislative proposal for an omnibus FIPs framework that would have applied to public and
private entities was scaled back and applied only to federal government agencies. See Woodrow Hartzog
& Neil Richards, Privacy’s Constitutional Moment and the Limits of Data Protection, 61 B.C. L. REV.
1687, 1703 (2020).
54 William McGeveran, Friending the Privacy Regulators, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 959, 966 (2016).
55 See id. at 978.
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financial data, and educational data.56 Congress adopted this approach in the
wake of the FIPs; with this statutory turn, information privacy evolved past
the common law’s emphasis on redressing past harm, such as injury to
feeling or reputation, and toward a forward-looking system to reduce the risk
of harm to individuals.57
This form of privacy statute attempts to calibrate privacy protection
according to the predicted level of risk.58 First, lawmakers “identify[] a
problem—‘a risk that a person might be harmed in the future.’”59 Then, they
“try to enumerate and categorize types of information that contribute to the
risk,” with categorization both “on a macro level (distinguishing between
health information, education information, and financial information) and on
a micro level (distinguishing between names, account numbers, and other
specific data fields).”60
Policymakers then prescribe particular, heightened protections for data
that falls within a sensitive category, within the narrow bounds articulated
by the relevant statute. For instance, the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA)’s Privacy Rule, which applies to the healthcare
context, reflects a policy calculation that health information that is identified
with a particular person poses enough of a risk of future harm to that
individual to warrant statutory protection.61 Once health information is
56 In addition to the Freedom of Information Act of 1966 (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (2018),
and regulation of government actors via the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2018), there are several
core sectoral elements. By way of example, personal health information is regulated by the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18, 25, 29, and 42 U.S.C.), and associated privacy rules, 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.508(a) (2007). Credit reporting and financial data are addressed by the Fair Credit Reporting Act
of 1970 (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2018), and Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), Pub.
L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–09 (2018)). Educational data is covered
by the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA), Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 484
(codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2018)). See Alicia Solow-Niederman, Beyond the Privacy Torts:
Reinvigorating a Common Law Approach for Data Breaches, 127 YALE L.J. F. 614, 617–18 &
n.13 (2018), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/beyond-the-privacy-torts [https://perma.cc/T45LK2DU]; see also Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy,
114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 587 (2014).
57 Ohm, supra note 52, at 1733–34.
58 Id. at 1734.
59 Id. (quoting Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 487–88 (2006)).
60
Id.
61 This category of shielded information is known as “protected health information” (PHI). What is
PHI?, HHS.GOV (Feb. 26, 2013), https://www.hhs.gov/answers/hipaa/what-is-phi/index.html
[https://perma.cc/2AB7-X27C]. PHI is “information, including demographic information, which relates
to: the individual’s past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition, the provision of health
care to the individual, or the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care to the[m],”
and that either “identifies the individual or for which there is a reasonable basis to believe can be used to
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“deidentified,” it is thought to no longer relate to an individual and,
accordingly, is no longer within HIPAA’s ambit.62 In other words, for
HIPAA to cover a given piece of health data, that data has to be personal in
the sense of being directly linked to, and identified with, a particular person.
If a bit of health data is directly linked to a given person, then HIPAA
regulations control how specified categories of persons or entities (such as
doctors or hospitals, as compared to non-healthcare actors) can access or
disseminate the information.63 In this case, the individual engaging with a
“covered entity” must be given notice of how the healthcare actor will make
use of protected health information.64 If the data is not connected with a
particular person, then HIPAA’s privacy protections do not apply, and the
information can flow freely unless subject to a different statutory or
regulatory restriction.65 HIPAA and other sectoral statutes include numerous
such categorizations and determinations about how to control dataflows. In
the main, these statutes share a common attribute: they see the challenge as
how to provide adequate opportunity to notify an individual about the
collection and use of their personal data in order to control what can
be done with that data and thereby preserve that same individual’s
informational privacy.66
This sectoral approach is linear: it relies on providing an individual with
opportunities to control the flow of certain bits of identifiable data about
them. Daniel Solove has described this approach as “privacy selfmanagement.”67 Under this regime, “law provides people with a set of rights
to enable them to make decisions about how to manage their data,” and the

identify the individual.” Guidance Regarding Methods for De-Identification of Protected
Health Information in Accordance with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) Privacy Rule, HHS.GOV (Nov. 6, 2015) [hereinafter HIPAA PHI De-Identification],
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/special-topics/de-identification/index.html
[https://perma.cc/J676-PDB4].
62 See HIPAA PHI De-Identification, supra note 61. But see Ohm, supra note 52, at 1736–38
(challenging the efficacy of deidentification to protect privacy of healthcare data).
63 See Nicolas P. Terry, Protecting Patient Privacy in the Age of Big Data, 81 UMKC L. REV. 385,
387, 407–08 (2012); Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, HHS.GOV (July 26, 2013),
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/laws-regulations/index.html
[https://perma.cc/G534-X77L] (explaining which actors are “covered entities” under the Privacy Rule).
64 See Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 63 (explaining that, subject to limited
exceptions, a “covered entity” must provide “notice” that “describe[s] the ways in which the covered
entity may use and disclose protected health information”).
65 See Terry, supra note 63, at 408; see also Nicolas P. Terry, Big Data and Regulatory Arbitrage in
Healthcare, in BIG DATA, HEALTH LAW, & BIOETHICS 56, 59–60 (I. Glenn Cohen, Holly Fernandez
Lynch, Effy Vayena & Urs Gasser eds., 2018) (discussing the limits of contemporary healthcare
data protections).
66 Hartzog, supra note 48, at 958–59.
67 Solove, supra note 46, at 1880.
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“rights to notice, access, and consent regarding the collection, use, and
disclosure of personal data,” in theory, permit individuals to manage their
personal privacy.68 Scholarly critique of this regime notwithstanding, this
central approach has dominated federal privacy law since the 1970s.
This approach is neither limited to the federal government nor an
artifact of laws that predate the digital era. Consider the California Consumer
Privacy Act of 2018 (CCPA), a state law that is considered one of the leading
information privacy statutes on the books in the United States.69 Rather than
adopt a sectoral approach, the CCPA takes a comprehensive tack and
explicitly recognizes the importance of advanced data analytics.
Specifically, the CCPA stipulates that its grant of consumer rights extends to
“[i]nferences drawn from . . . [personal information] to create a profile about
a consumer reflecting the consumer’s preferences, characteristics,
psychological trends, predispositions, behavior, attitudes, intelligence,
abilities, and aptitudes.”70 The California Attorney General’s first opinion
interpreting the CCPA, moreover, underscores the significance of inferences
as “one of the key mechanisms by which information becomes valuable to
businesses,” concluding that “inferences appear to be at the heart of the
problems that the CCPA seeks to address.”71 The CCPA thus expands the
category of information that is covered, recognizing that tools such as ML
make data significant in distinct ways when it comes to personal privacy.
But this broader coverage does not represent a new strategy for how the
information is regulated. Instead, the statute remains focused on individual
rights. It attempts to empower individuals by providing opportunities for
those individuals to obtain access to “personal information” that businesses
have about them, including inferences used to “create a profile about a

68

Id.
Chander et al., supra note 3, at 1734. California’s Attorney General approved regulations
implementing the CCPA in March 2021. See Press Release, State of Cal. Dept. of Just., Attorney General
Becerra Announces Approval of Additional Regulations That Empower Data Privacy Under the
California Consumer Privacy Act (Mar. 15, 2021), https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorneygeneral-becerra-announces-approval-additional-regulations-empower-data
[https://perma.cc/B8BMUWCU]. In addition, in November 2020, California voters passed a referendum, the California Privacy
Rights Act (CPRA), that clarified certain consumer rights under the CCPA and created
a state privacy protection agency. See CCPA and CPRA, INT’L ASS’N PRIV. PROS.,
https://iapp.org/resources/topics/ccpa-and-cpra [https://perma.cc/6CDW-AMHJ]. The CPRA takes full
legal effect in January 2023, with enforcement set to begin on July 1, 2023. See Off. of Att’y Gen., State
of Cal., Opinion No. 20-303 on the California Consumer Privacy Act 1, 8–9 (Mar. 10, 2022),
https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/opinions/pdfs/20-303.pdf [https://perma.cc/6N5A-DMD5].
70 California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) of 2018, C AL . C IV . C ODE § 1798.140(o)(1)(K)
(West).
71 Off. of Att’y Gen., supra note 69, at 13.
69
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consumer,”72 or to opt out of data collection altogether.73 This intervention,
in the end, comes down to the same linear approach of notice, consent, and
control by the affected person. Regulation of privacy remains a personal,
control-centered affair.
Complementing the sectoral approach, the FTC has emerged as the
leading regulator of information privacy at the federal level.74 Recall that the
U.S. legal tradition, in functional terms, positions information privacy in
terms of consumer protection.75 Whether data collection, storage, or use is
seen as problematic depends not on substantive law, but rather on whether
consumers have the opportunity to exercise control.76 When the FTC
examines the agreements that consumers have entered, the central questions
are whether a consumer consented after the company provided notice and
choice of its policies concerning consumer data, and whether that company
then complied with the terms of the agreement.77 Violations of these
agreements may lead to FTC enforcement actions.
For over two decades, the FTC has used its authority under Section 5 of
the FTC Act “to police unfair and deceptive trade practices” as a way to
enforce private entities’ privacy policies as well as other privacy statutes and
transatlantic data-sharing agreements.78 These enforcement actions do not
rely on individuals’ actions; rather, they target corporate conduct.
Nonetheless, they reflect the same core calculation: the objective is to define
privacy in terms of an individual’s control over information about them, as
expressed through the exercise of notice and consent rights. Applying this
calculation, objectionable conduct consists of unfair or deceptive corporate
practices in which consent was obtained deceptively or the collection or use
72 See, e.g., Off. of Att’y Gen., supra note 69, at 12–13 (“[I]n light of the plain meaning of section
1798.140, subdivision (o), inferences must be disclosed to the consumer upon request.”).
73 See Cohen, supra note 13 (discussing the CCPA’s opt-in-or-out approach, which is codified at
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.120(a) (West)).
74 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 56, at 587. State attorneys general play an important role at the
state level. See Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 92 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 747, 748–51, 758–95 (2016). Such state-level action, as Citron notes, has potential to “fill
gaps in privacy law.” Id. at 750. Because this Article aims to foreground the gaps and liabilities of the
American system as a whole, discussion of state-level regulatory enforcement is beyond its scope.
75 See supra text accompanying notes 53–57.
76 See Solove, supra note 46, at 1880 (“The goal of this bundle of [privacy] rights is to provide people
with control over their personal data, and through this control people can decide for themselves how to
weigh the costs and benefits of the collection, use, or disclosure of their information.”).
77 See id. at 1884 (describing the FTC’s role as an enforcer of privacy notices). Of course, as
described above, a particular sectoral statute may establish heightened protections that regulate acceptable
data practices, delineate what is required to obtain consent, or impose other restrictions.
78 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 56, at 585; A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s
Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, FED. TRADE COMM’N CONSUMER ADVICE (May 2021),
https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority [https://perma.cc/SC3B-FWJH].
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of information violates the terms of the initial agreement.79 This mode of
enforcement can, over time, generate what Daniel Solove and Woodrow
Hartzog have called a “new common law” of privacy that relies on
enforcement actions and informal guidance to set forth the bounds of
acceptable conduct.80
The FTC’s “common law” approach allows the Commission to evolve
by applying its control-focused regulatory approach to newly salient
categories of consumer data. For example, if health-like data that is left
uncovered by HIPAA becomes increasingly important, then the FTC can
attempt to step into the gap. The Commission did just that in an early 2021
enforcement action involving Flo, an app designed to help women track
menstruation and fertility cycles that touted the ability to “[l]og over 70
symptoms and activities to get the most precise AI-based period and
ovulation predictions.”81 The FTC took action against Flo because it had
shared user data with Facebook in ways that violated the app’s own privacy
policy.82 Because Flo “broke its privacy promises,” the company’s
misleading claims were subject to FTC action; thus, the Commission could
use its enforcement authority to signal the realm of (un)acceptable conduct
for a kind of sensitive information that was left uncovered by sectoral
statutes.83 Furthermore, recognizing the importance of this and similar data
79 The FTC’s deception analysis may look beyond the specific promises made in the company’s
privacy policy and consider the course of dealing between a consumer and the company. See Solove &
Hartzog, supra note 56, at 628.
80 See id. at 627.
81 See FLO, https://flo.health [https://perma.cc/L8AY-N39J]. Because information of the sort that Flo
gathers is collected by an app, and not in the context of a medical relationship, it is not considered
healthcare data protected by HIPAA. See Miles Plant, Does Your Health App Protect Your Sensitive Info?,
FED. TRADE COMM’N CONSUMER ADVICE (Jan. 13, 2021), https://consumer.ftc.gov/consumeralerts/2021/01/does-your-health-app-protect-your-sensitive-info [https://perma.cc/X4B2-R54K].
82 The Wall Street Journal first reported this development in 2019. Sam Schechner & Mark Secada,
You Give Apps Sensitive Personal Information. Then They Tell Facebook., WALL ST. J. (Feb. 22, 2019,
11:07 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/you-give-apps-sensitive-personal-information-then-they-tellfacebook-11550851636 [https://perma.cc/FVG4-2N7F]. The FTC’s complaint documents these practices
in detail. See Complaint, Flo Health, Inc., Docket No. C-4747, FTC File No. 1923133 (June 22, 2021),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/flo_health_complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/NMV7C9QP]. The FTC settled this matter in January 2021 and issued its final decision and order in June 2021.
See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Developer of Popular Women’s Fertility-Tracking App Settles
FTC Allegations that It Misled Consumers About the Disclosure of Their Health Data
(Jan. 13, 2021), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2021/01/developer-popular-womensfertility-tracking-app-settles-ftc [https://perma.cc/7WXT-2EGA]; Flo Health, Inc., Docket No.
C-4747, FTC File No. 1923133 (June 22, 2021), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/
192_3133_flo_health_decision_and_order.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PP3-2JXG].
83 See Lesley Fair, Health App Broke Its Privacy Promises by Disclosing Intimate Details About
Users, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Jan. 13, 2021, 11:27 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/blogs/business-blog/2021/01/health-app-broke-its-privacy-promises-disclosing-intimate
[https://perma.cc/MFW3-XXUH].
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as health apps and connected devices become even more common features
of contemporary life, the Commission is reviewing its existing regulations
regarding breaches of unsecured “individually identifiable health
information” that are not covered by HIPAA and has issued policy guidance
clarifying the scope of its existing rule on this matter.84
These enforcement actions and policy stances, however, represent
evolution to expand the reach of existing protections without fundamentally
altering the underlying regulatory regime.85 Such evolutionary adaptation
builds from what came before, starting with the terms agreed to in the privacy
policy and relying on the baseline assumption that an individual’s control
over their own data is central to privacy protection and exhaustive of
privacy interests.
Even more innovative FTC approaches still reflect the same
fundamental assumption. Consider a path-breaking FTC enforcement action
to regulate the deployment of trained ML models more directly. In early
2021, the Commission entered a settlement with Everalbum, the developer
of a photo-storage app called Ever.86 The FTC’s complaint alleged that the
developer acted improperly when it pivoted Ever from cloud storage to facial
recognition services and “deceived consumers about its use of facial
recognition technology and its retention of the photos and videos of users

84
See 16 C.F.R. § 318.2. As part of its review of the Health Breach Notification Rule,
the FTC is “actively considering . . . the application of the Rule to mobile applications
[like Flo] . . . that handle consumers’ sensitive health information.” Letter from
April J. Tabor, Sec’y, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Pam Dixon, Exec. Dir., World Priv.
F. (June 17, 2021), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/192_3133_-_flo_health_inc.__comment_response_letters.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6L5-FV5N]. Moreover, in late 2021, the FTC issued
a policy statement clarifying that the Rule applies to health apps and connected devices,
including apps that rely on both health information (such as blood sugar) and non-health
information (such as dates on a phone’s calendar). FED. TRADE COMM’N, STATEMENT OF THE
COMMISSION ON BREACHES BY HEALTH APPS AND OTHER CONNECTED DEVICES 1 (2021),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1596364/statement_of_the_commission
_on_breaches_by_health_apps_and_other_connected_devices.pdf [https://perma.cc/ER3E-J6CB].
85
This fact is unsurprising; a common law regime is, after all, incremental by nature. See
Shyamkrishna Balganesh & Gideon Parchomovsky, Structure and Value in the Common Law, 163 U. PA.
L. REV. 1241, 1267 (2015) (first citing P.S. ATIYAH, PRAGMATISM AND THEORY IN ENGLISH LAW (1987);
then citing BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW (1924); then citing OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW 1–2 (Little, Brown & Co. 1923) (1881); and then citing Oliver Wendell
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897)); Solove & Hartzog, supra note 56,
at 620.
86 Complaint, Everalbum, Inc., Docket No C-4743, FTC File No. 1923172 (May 6, 2021),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/everalbum_order.pdf [https://perma.cc/35QK-Z3Y8];
see Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, California Company Settles FTC Allegations It Deceived
Consumers About Use of Facial Recognition in Photo Storage App (Jan. 11, 2021),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2021/01/california-company-settles-ftc-allegations-itdeceived-consumers [https://perma.cc/ULG5-3JTZ].
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who deactivated their accounts.”87 The settlement is remarkable because
it does more than merely require deletion of improperly collected data. It
goes further, requiring Everalbum to delete any ML model that was trained
using that data.88 The Commission’s “algorithmic disgorgement” remedy
reflects a more sophisticated understanding of the fact that data matters in
the applied context of ML models, and not merely at a fixed point of
collection.89 It represents the FTC’s ability to adapt its remedies to reflect
technological change.
Although this adaptation is pragmatic and forward-looking in some
ways, it remains an evolutionary continuation of the FTC’s historic
approach. As with the Flo enforcement, the FTC took action because of
alleged corporate deception. In the case of Everalbum, the company
“represented that it would not apply facial recognition technology to users’
content unless users affirmatively chose to activate the feature,” but
automatically applied it to users in most states; did not limit the facial
recognition feature to the stated uses, and instead used images as data inputs
to develop facial recognition technology; and did not comply with the
company’s statements that it would delete information associated with
deactivated users.90 These deceptive actions broke the promises made to
users, thereby compromising individuals’ ability to exercise control over
their data. It was that corporate deception concerning users’ control of their
data disclosures that drove the FTC’s enforcement action.91
87

Press Release, supra note 86; Complaint, supra note 82.
Press Release, supra note 86; see Natasha Lomas, FTC Settlement with Ever Orders Data and AIs
Deleted After Facial Recognition Pivot, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 12, 2021, 7:43 AM),
https://techcrunch.com/2021/01/12/ftc-settlement-with-ever-orders-data-and-ais-deleted-after-facialrecognition-pivot [https://perma.cc/P24T-38G5].
89 See Rebecca Kelly Slaughter, Acting Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at Future of
Privacy Forum: Protecting Consumer Privacy in a Time of Crisis 2 (Feb. 10, 2021),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1587283/fpf_opening_remarks_210_.pd
f [https://perma.cc/KL73-C62C] (emphasizing the “meaningful disgorgement” of “ill-gotten data” gains
as an innovative remedy in privacy cases). For further discussion of why data deletion alone is insufficient
for ML systems, the FTC’s algorithmic-disgorgement actions to date, and a critique of the algorithmicdisgorgement remedy, see Tiffany C. Li, Algorithmic Destruction, SMU L. REV. (forthcoming 2022)
(manuscript at 10–12, 21–24), https://papers.ssrn.com/a=4066845 [https://perma.cc/T246-9XQ2].
90 Press Release, supra note 86.
91 The FTC applied the same remedy in a settlement with WW International (formerly Weight
Watchers) and its subsidiary, Kurbo, in early 2022. See Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction,
Civil Penalty Judgement, and Other Relief at 2, 7–8, United States v. Kurbo Inc., No. 22-cv-00946
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2022), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/wwkurbostipulatedorder.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NQ58-CVJ9] (defining “Affected Work Product” to include “any models or algorithms
developed in whole or in part using Personal Information Collected from Children through the Kurbo
Program,” and requiring destruction or deletion of such material); Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n,
FTC Takes Action Against Company Formerly Known as Weight Watchers for Illegally Collecting Kids’
88
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Federal administrative enforcement thus rests on the same linear
principle as sectoral statutes: both protect information privacy by regulating
individuals’ ability to control information about themselves.
II. MACHINE LEARNING AND INFORMATION PRIVACY PROTECTIONS
This Part details how machine learning routes around contemporary
American information privacy protections and how formal legal protections
have not accounted for the power of data-driven inferences or reckoned with
which firms and organizations are able to wield them, and to what effect.
A. Information Privacy, Eroded
The application of machine learning technologies exposes cracks under
the surface of the contemporary information privacy model. A close analysis
of ML capabilities highlights two fault lines in privacy protections, which
this Section explores in turn. The first involves the difficulty of determining
which bits of data warrant protection: ML makes data outside of sensitive
contexts far more significant, challenging any one person’s ability to know
what to protect. The second involves the difficulty of accounting for
the reach of data-driven analysis: ML amplifies the manner in which data
about one person may be used to make predictions or discern information
about members of groups. Each erodes the assumptions that the
contemporary regime makes about control and how an individual is
positioned to exercise it.
1. The Context Challenge
The individual-centered control model of information privacy
protection assumes that it’s possible for a person, at the time that they are
presented with a privacy policy, to assess the consequences that might flow
from releasing personally identifiable data. Data analytics have long put

Sensitive Health Data (Mar. 4, 2022), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2022/03/ftctakes-action-against-company-formerly-known-weight-watchers-illegally-collecting-kids-sensitive
[https://perma.cc/EQQ3-PL8N]. The FTC’s complaint alleged that “Kurbo by WW” marketed its weightloss app to children and operated with actual knowledge of its collection of personal information from
children, while failing to “provid[e] direct notice . . . [and] obtain[] parents’ verifiable parental consent”
as required by the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) Rule. Complaint for Permanent
Injunction, Civil Penalties, and Other Equitable Relief at 13–15, Kurbo, No. 22-cv-00946,
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/filed_complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/JD6A-USJ4]. The
FTC’s action in the WW–Kurbo settlement extends the same pattern: enforcement against a company
that contravened notice-and-choice-style protections intended to control that firm’s treatment of a
particular category of data (here, data concerning an especially vulnerable population, children). Although
this remedy is novel, its logic, wherein the enforcement action is rooted directly in a firm’s violation of
controlling law that emphasizes control of a specified category of data, is not.
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pressure on that assumption.92 The classic example in privacy scholarship is
Target’s prediction of pregnancy based on purchasing patterns, to the great
chagrin of a teenager whose father became aware of her condition when he
received a coupon book from the company.93 The Target model relied on data
scientist Andrew Pole’s explicit identification of approximately twenty-five
products “that, when analyzed together, allowed him to assign each shopper
a ‘pregnancy prediction’ score.”94 When consumers signed up for an in-store
shopping card and consented to sharing their purchasing behavior with the
store, they probably didn’t imagine this sort of predictive modelling.95
Today, the Target example is the tip of the data analytics iceberg.
Imagine, for instance, a classification task, such as distinguishing
photographs of Chihuahuas from photographs of blueberry muffins:96

92 See, e.g., Solon Barocas & Helen Nissenbaum, Big Data’s End Run Around Anonymity and
Consent, in PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: FRAMEWORKS FOR ENGAGEMENT 44, 45–46
(Julia Lane, Victoria Stodden, Stefan Bender & Helen Nissenbaum eds., 2014) (underscoring, in the age
of big-data analytics, “the ultimate inefficacy of consent as a matter of individual choice and the absurdity
of believing that notice and consent can fully specify the terms of interaction between data collector and
data subject”); Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to
Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 98–109 (2014) (noting privacy problems that “go
beyond just increasing the amount and scope of potentially private information” and emphasizing the
challenge of “know[ing] in advance exactly when a learning algorithm will predict [personally
identifiable information] about an individual,” making it impossible to “predict where and when to
assemble privacy protections around that data”); see also Katherine J. Strandburg, Monitoring,
Datafication, and Consent: Legal Approaches to Privacy in the Big Data Context, in PRIVACY, BIG DATA,
AND THE PUBLIC GOOD, supra, at 7, 8 & n.13 (noting widespread recognition that the “notice and consent
paradigm is inadequate to confront the privacy issues posed by the big data explosion” and compiling
scholarship); Dwyer, supra note 10, at 4 (discussing limitations of the individual-control model in the age
of “pervasive computing”).
93 Kashmir Hill, How Target Figured Out a Teen Girl Was Pregnant Before Her Father Did, FORBES
(Feb. 16, 2012, 11:02 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/02/16/how-target-figuredout-a-teen-girl-was-pregnant-before-her-father-did [https://perma.cc/CSW5-3AFB].
94 Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2012)
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html [https://perma.cc/DDT6-GF72].
95 See Crawford & Schultz, supra note 92, at 94–95.
96 Brad Folkens, Chihuahua or Muffin?, CLOUDSIGHT (May 19, 2017), https://blog.cloudsight.ai/
chihuahua-or-muffin-1bdf02ec1680 [https://perma.cc/4PA6-ZPUH] (highlighting Karen Zack’s
delightful “Animal or Food?” Twitter thread); see Karen Zack (@teenybiscuit), TWITTER (Mar. 9, 2016,
7:40 PM), https://twitter.com/teenybiscuit/status/707727863571582978 [https://perma.cc/KRU4BNV3].

379

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
FIGURE 1

How would a human perform this task? Without technology, a human
being would likely identify features such as visible whiskers or the angle of
the head, in the case of dogs, or paper wrappers and gooey objects streaked
through the dough, in the case of muffins. Without ML technology,
a programmer would need to extrapolate out from those human observations;
specify attributes such as fur color, position, and pose that make a canine
unlike a pastry; and code an “expert system” to make predictions based on
those attributes.97
Now, however, ML permits a different path.98 If provided with a
sufficiently large number of photographs of Chihuahuas and photographs of

97

This discussion in general, and the contrast between rule-based expert systems and correlational
ML models in particular, is simplified for clarity. For further description of rule-based expert systems in
the context of law, see Edwina L. Rissland, Artificial Intelligence and Law: Stepping Stones to a Model
of Legal Reasoning, 99 YALE L.J. 1957, 1959–60, 1965–68 (1990).
98 Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 89–95 (2014) (explaining how
ML classifiers can detect patterns to model complex phenomena, without explicit programming). There
are many design choices to be made along the way. For an accessible discussion of all the choices that
humans make in developing a ML model, from defining the problem to cleaning the data to selection of
the statistical model and beyond, see Lehr & Ohm, supra note 12, at 669–701.
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muffins, an ML algorithm can “learn” to identify patterns in the images that
distinguish the two categories.99 It does so through pathways that are distinct
from human cognition: a human, for instance, might detect visible whiskers
or gooey objects streaked through dough; a computer might notice certain
patterns in the edges or coloration.100 Ultimately, by exposing the training
algorithm to enough data, prelabelled as “Chihuahua” or “muffin,” it is
possible to develop a working model that makes predictions about the right
category—dog or pastry—when applied to a new image.101
Machine learning thus facilitates an entirely different channel through
which to derive information. ML relies on detecting patterns in datasets, as
opposed to making causal predictions or engaging in more formal reasoning.
It’s as if, rather than manually detecting patterns in purchases after asking
consumers to consent to that data collection, a store collected social media
posts; matched customers’ names on in-store discount cards against their
social media profiles; and parsed a large dataset of social media posts for
grammatical and syntactical habits—such as, say, overuse of em dashes—to
discern personality traits that made customers good or bad bets for a special
credit card opportunity. This hypothetical is not the stuff of science fiction;
indeed, one car-insurance company recently used social media text to “look
for personality traits that are linked to safe driving.”102 All the store needs to
do to make this scenario real is to combine a similar data-analytic approach
with an internal dataset concerning which kinds of customers make for good
and bad creditors. The information privacy status quo, however, doesn’t
account for data’s amped-up analytic potential.

This explanation refers to “supervised ML,” which has, to date, been the dominant method. The
concerns presented here would apply with even more force to other methods of “unsupervised” and
“reinforcement” learning, which require even less human involvement in training the model.
99 For a diagram and summary of how advanced “convolutional neural networks” recognize images,
see John Pavlus, Same or Different? The Question Flummoxes Neural Networks, QUANTA MAG.
(June
23,
2021),
https://www.quantamagazine.org/same-or-different-ai-cant-tell-20210623
[https://perma.cc/EN2N-2HUC].
100 See Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines,
87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1089–98 (2018) (analyzing how ML predictions can be inscrutable and
nonintuitive to humans); Jenna Burrell, How the Machine ‘Thinks’: Understanding Opacity in Machine
Learning Algorithms, 3 BIG DATA & SOC’Y 1, 3–5 (2016) (discussing how ML algorithmic processes can
be opaque to humans).
101 See Surden, supra note 98, at 90–93 (describing a typical pattern detection process for detecting
spam emails).
102 See Graham Ruddick, Admiral to Price Car Insurance Based on Facebook Posts, GUARDIAN
(Nov. 1, 2016, 8:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/nov/02/admiral-to-price-carinsurance-based-on-facebook-posts [https://perma.cc/U6HQ-D5UJ]; Zittrain, supra note 5 (drawing on
the car-insurance example to emphasize how “[d]ata from one place can be used to inform
another [context]”).
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The problem is that the linear protective regime turns on an individual’s
right to control data about the self. This approach relies on clear, welldelineated, nonleaky contexts for data disclosure. A consumer’s mental
model about how their data might be used—and hence their choice to consent
to particular collection and processing—is pegged to a particular
understanding of the contexts in which that data is salient.
But ML produces a context challenge. Machine-learning analytics
make it practically impossible for an individual to determine how data might
or might not be significant or sensitive in a future setting.103 HIPAA is a
prime example. The statute applies to healthcare data as specified in the text
and associated regulations—but not to health information outside of the
regulated space. Thus, nonmedical data, such as health information
voluntarily offered in an online support group for individuals suffering from
a particular medical condition,104 is constrained only by, first, whether an
individual had notice of and consented to the online platform’s terms of
service and privacy policy; and second, whether the company complied with
those terms.
These stark regulatory lines do not track the ways in which data in one
context might be used to discern further information about health. A post in
an online group, outside of the space regulated by HIPAA, might inform a
text-analysis model that predicts substance abuse.105 Similarly uncovered by
statutory protections is a category that Mason Marks calls “emergent medical
data”: “health information inferred by AI from data points with no readily
observable connections to one’s health.”106 For instance, ML analysis might

103 This collapsing of context, which makes it more challenging to manage one’s privacy, has a
family resemblance to the concept of “context collapse” on social media networks, wherein the
“flatten[ing]” of previously distinct contexts makes it more challenging to manage one’s identity. See
Alice E. Marwick & danah boyd, I Tweet Honestly, I Tweet Passionately: Twitter Users, Context
Collapse, and the Imagined Audience, 13 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 114, 122 (2010).
104 See, e.g., Kelsey Ables, Covid ‘Long Haulers’ Have Nowhere Else to Turn —
So They’re Finding Each Other Online, WASH. POST (Oct. 1, 2020, 9:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/10/01/long-haulers-covid-facebook-support-group
[https://perma.cc/97UG-HG99].
105 Tao Ding, Warren K. Bickel & Shimei Pan, Social Media-Based Substance Use
Prediction, ARXIV (May 31, 2017), https://arxiv.org/abs/1705.05633 [https://perma.cc/87Q3-LP75];
see
also
Emerging
Technology
from
the
arXiv,
How
Data
Mining
Facebook Messages Can Reveal Substance Abusers, MIT TECH. REV. (May 26, 2017),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2017/05/26/151516/how-data-mining-facebook-messages-canreveal-substance-abusers [https://perma.cc/97LG-W3CL] (discussing the Ding, Bickel & Pan study).
106 Mason Marks, Emergent Medical Data: Health Information Inferred by Artificial Intelligence,
11 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 995, 997, 1002–03 (2021); see also Eric Horvitz & Deirdre Mulligan, Data,
Privacy, and the Greater Good, 349 SCIENCE 253, 253 (2015) (noting the potential for ML to make
“‘category-jumping’ inferences about health conditions or propensities from nonmedical data generated
far outside the medical context”).
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connect the use of religious language such as the word “pray” on Facebook
to a likelihood of diabetes, or the use of particular Instagram filters to a
likelihood of depression. Critically, ML approaches can generate
information from data points that a disclosing party might not have even
considered significant.107 The power and peril of ML comes from the ability
to discern patterns by analyzing large datasets that may be contextually
unrelated.108 Because an individual cannot predict that a particular bit of data
could yield insights about sensitive matters, ML undermines the viability of
relying on individual control over a protected category, such as “medical
data,” to shield information privacy interests. Under these conditions, it’s
just not feasible for the individual to predict in which spaces, and at which
points, data might be relevant for processing.
This class of challenge is not limited to health information, nor to any
particular sensitive setting. Return for a moment to the neighborhood bigbox store. Perhaps that store uses a facial recognition tool that identifies
consumers the minute they enter the store, cross-references this information
to locate the person’s social media profile, derives correlations about
personality based on the messages posted in that profile, and then uses this
profile to instruct the security officer how closely to monitor that particular
shopper.109 It seems unlikely that a social media user who consented to a
platform’s terms of service imagined that disclosure in that context would
permit such emergent profiling. When any bit of data might be relevant in
any range of future contexts, it becomes impossible for an individual to
conceptualize the risks of releasing data.
To be sure, versions of this challenge existed before ML. As one analog
example, if you walk in public, a passerby on the street might overhear you
on a cell phone conversation confessing your ambivalence about an
employment opportunity, and then turn out to be your interviewer for that
job. Still, ML is a force multiplier of this latent context challenge. The
107 See Bellovin et al., supra note 10, at 590–96 (detailing how different forms of ML can deduce
information from large datasets).
108 See Przemysław Pałka, Data Management Law for the 2020s: The Lost Origins and the New
Needs, 68 BUFF. L. REV. 559, 592 (2020).
109 See Tom Chivers, Facial Recognition . . . Coming to a Supermarket Near You, GUARDIAN (Aug.
4, 2019, 4:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/aug/04/facial-recognitionsupermarket-facewatch-ai-artificial-intelligence-civil-liberties
[https://perma.cc/M9WB-FV7K]
(suggesting retail facial recognition could help to prevent shoplifting). The prospect of retail facial
recognition in the United States is not, in fact, hypothetical. In 2020, Reuters confirmed that Rite Aid,
over about eight years, had added facial recognition systems to two hundred stores in the United States.
In New York and Los Angeles, Rite Aid had added these systems “in largely lower-income, non-white
neighborhoods.” Jeffrey Dastin, Rite Aid Deployed Facial Recognition Systems in Hundreds of U.S.
Stores, REUTERS (July 28, 2020, 11:00 AM), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usariteaid-software [https://perma.cc/VJV6-DH57].

383

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

technology accelerates what Margot Kaminski, drawing on work by Jack
Balkin and Reva Siegel, calls “disruption of the ‘imagined regulatory
scene,’” which occurs when “sociotechnical change” alters “the imagined
paradigmatic scenario” for a given law “by constraining, enabling, or
mediating behavior, both by actors we want the law to constrain and actors
we want the law to protect.”110 The deployment of ML across a range of
social contexts disrupts information privacy’s imagined regulatory scene.
Protective regimes for information privacy disregard this reality at their peril.
2. The Classification Challenge
So, too, does ML amplify a second latent issue: the ways that data about
one person may affect members of groups. Many ML models are
classificatory, in the sense that they use large datasets of information about
many individuals to make predictions about third parties.111 Consider, for
instance, a bevy of emerging tools that claim to predict health outcomes,
including the risk that veterans will commit suicide,112 the likelihood of onset
of Alzheimer’s disease,113 the identification of conditions ranging from rare
genetic disease,114 and depression.115 These models share a basic pattern: they
require many data points, aggregate this data to form a correlation-driven
model about a group, and then probabilistically infer that new cases are like
or unlike members of the group such that a particular group label does or
doesn’t apply to those third parties.116 The goal is typically “to make
predictions or estimates of some outcome,” without specifying the means to

110 Margot E. Kaminski, Technological ‘Disruption’ of the Law’s Imagined Scene: Some Lessons
from Lex Informatica, 35 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 14, 17) (citing Jack
M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements, 154 U. PENN. L. REV.
927 (2006)).
111 See Pałka, supra note 108, at 595 (discussing third-party externalities that flow from one person’s
decisions about collection of their data).
112 Benedict Carey, Can an Algorithm Prevent Suicide?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/23/health/artificial-intelligence-veterans-suicide.html
[https://perma.cc/Q9MN-QCJL].
113 Elif Eyigoz, Sachin Mathur, Mar Santamaria, Guillermo Cecchi & Melissa Naylor,
Linguistic Markers Predict Onset of Alzheimer’s Disease, ECLINICALMEDICINE, Nov. 2020, at
1, 7, https://www.thelancet.com/action/showPdf?pii=S2589-5370%2820%2930327-8 [https://perma.cc/
XG8F-RPMJ].
114 Yaron Gurovich et al., Identifying Facial Phenotypes of Genetic Disorders Using Deep Learning,
25 NATURE MED. 60, 63 (2019).
115 Kyle Wiggers, Alphabet’s Project Amber Uses AI to Try to Diagnose Depression from Brain
Waves, VENTUREBEAT (Nov. 2, 2020, 12:40 PM), https://venturebeat.com/2020/11/02/alphabets-projectamber-leverages-ai-to-identify-brain-wave-data-relevant-to-anxiety-and-depression [https://perma.cc/
C7E9-GTLM]; Lingyun Wen, Xin Li, Guodong Guo & Yu Zhu, Automated Depression Diagnosis Based
on Facial Dynamic Analysis and Sparse Coding, 10 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. FORENSICS & SEC.
1432, 1432 (2015), https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7063266 [https://perma.cc/9XFF-6ADF].
116 Each of these steps entails many human decisions. See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 12, at 669–701.
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arrive at that outcome.117 In this way, data about one person becomes part of
a tool used to, in effect, make educated guesses about other people—
including guesses about information that those other people might prefer not
to disclose.
American information privacy law has largely failed to recognize the
distinct challenges that arise when it becomes possible to make these kinds
of connections between individuals (whose data is collected) and members
of groups (to whom data-driven predictions are applied).118 There is, to be
sure, an increasingly active literature that emphasizes how information
privacy is relational as a general matter,119 and how big-data analytics in
particular make informational privacy relational, not individual.120 For
example, Solon Barocas and Helen Nissenbaum identify the risk of a
“tyranny of the minority” in big-data analytics when “the volunteered
information of the few can unlock the same information about the many.”121
And more recently, Salomé Viljoen emphasizes the importance of a
“relational” theory of data governance.122 As Viljoen explains, dataflows
entail not only “vertical relation[s]” between a particular individual and a
data collector, but also “horizontal relations” between the individual and
“others [who] share relevant population features with the data subject.”123
Viljoen focuses on the manner in which “informational infrastructures” rely
on group classification to “make sense of” individuals by taking a “relevant
shared feature,” generating a prediction and associated “social meaning”
based upon that shared feature, and then applying this prediction to a third
party deemed to fall within the relevant grouping.124

117

Id. at 671.
See Viljoen, supra note 13, at 613 (analyzing “the absence of horizontal data relations in datagovernance law”); see also Cohen, supra note 13 (critiquing privacy law’s reliance on “[a]tomistic, post
hoc assertions of individual control rights” that “cannot meaningfully discipline networked processes that
operate at scale”). My definition of data subject covers both categories. See infra text accompanying notes
224–226.
119 See Richards & Hartzog, supra note 21, at 494 n.9 (compiling important work focused on
relationships in privacy law); Ian Kerr, Schrödinger’s Robot: Privacy in Uncertain States,
20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 123, 127–32 (2019) (contending that a “relational core” is the “common
denominator” of many seemingly disparate privacy theories).
120
See Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 92, at 61–64.
121 Id. at 61–62 (identifying this risk and citing the Target pregnancy-prediction example); see supra
text accompanying notes 84–87.
122 Viljoen, supra note 13, at 603–16; see also Omri Ben-Shahar, Data Pollution, 11 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 104, 106 (2019) (contending that the “harms from data misuse are often far greater than the
sum of private injuries to the individuals whose information is taken”).
123 Viljoen, supra note 13, at 607, 611–12.
124 Id. at 607.
118

385

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

This way of understanding data relations has some resemblance to a
rich transatlantic literature.125 For instance, Brent Mittelstadt, building on the
foundational work of Luciano Floridi, has advanced a theory of group
privacy. Mittelstadt maintains that privacy, understood as “the right to
control data about oneself,” is not possible for the individual under the
conditions of algorithmic classification.126 Contending that a group or an
individual’s “right to inviolate personality” can be “violated when [it] is
crafted externally,” including through correlative, algorithmic decisional
processes, he suggests that “algorithmically grouped individuals have a
collective interest in how information describing the group is generated and
used.”127 As Mittelstadt himself recognizes, group rights are legally and
morally contested; thus, his work advances a philosophical proposal and not
a policy intervention.128
In addition, another European scholar and frequent coauthor with
Mittelstadt, Sandra Wachter, has recently focused on the legal implications
of advanced data analytics.129 Wachter argues that the European Union’s data
protection regime may not amply preserve privacy or protect against
discrimination in the face of “affinity profiling,” a data-driven online
behavioral advertising practice that “looks for a similarity between the
assumed interests of a user and the interests of a group.”130 Wachter

125 For a pre-GDPR account, see, for example, David-Olivier Jaquet-Chiffelle, Reply: Direct and
Indirect Profiling in the Light of Virtual Persons, in PROFILING THE EUROPEAN CITIZEN: CROSSDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 9, at 34, 34–36. Jaquet-Chiffelle replies to Mireille Hildebrandt,
distinguishing between individual versus group profiling by defining and discussing the difference
between “direct profiling” (in which a profile is applied to the same person who provided the data) and
“indirect profiling,” (in which data is collected from a large population).
126 Brent Mittelstadt, From Individual to Group Privacy in Big Data Analytics, 30 PHIL. & TECH.
475, 481 (2017).
127 Id. at 476, 483.
128 See Brent Mittelstadt, From Individual to Group Privacy in Biomedical Big Data, in BIG DATA,
HEALTH LAW, & BIOETHICS, supra note 65, at 175, 176 (arguing that “ad hoc groups” created through
big data analytics “possess privacy interests that are sufficiently important to warrant formal protection
through recognition of a moral (and perhaps, in the future, legal) right to group privacy”).
129 Wachter and Mittelstadt have collaborated on several pieces concerning European law and the
challenges posed by machine learning. See generally, e.g., Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt & Chris
Russell, Bias Preservation in Machine Learning: The Legality of Fairness Metrics Under EU NonDiscrimination Law, 123 W. VA. L. REV. 735 (2021) (providing recommendations to increase fairness in
machine learning under European Union nondiscrimination law); Sandra Wachter & Brent Mittelstadt, A
Right to Reasonable Inferences: Re-Thinking Data Protection Law in the Age of Big Data and AI,
2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 494 (2019) [hereinafter Wachter & Mittelstadt, Reasonable Inferences]
(advocating for a new data protection right to “help close the accountability gap currently posed by ‘highrisk inferences’ . . . that are privacy-invasive or reputation-damaging, or have low verifiability in the
sense of being predictive or opinion-based while being used for important decisions”).
130 Sandra Wachter, Affinity Profiling and Discrimination by Association in Online Behavioral
Advertising, 35 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 367, 370 (2020).
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highlights the ability to draw inferences about an individual, stating that a
data processor can make predictions about “[p]otentially sensitive
information such as religious or political beliefs, sexual orientation, race or
ethnicity, physical or mental health status, or sex or gender identity . . . from
online behavior without users ever being aware.”131 This inferential
capability introduces the risk of not only privacy invasions, but also
“discrimination by association” if individuals are not shielded from
discriminatory inferences that are drawn based on their predicted affinity
with a protected group.132 Even under stricter European data protection
standards, however, inferences tend to receive “economy class” protection,
at best.133
This work on data relations, group privacy, and associational
discrimination speaks to a latent flaw in the contemporary protective regime:
its focus on a particular individual’s control over data about them. Data’s
significance, however, is not just about how that data relates to any one
person. It is also about population-level group-based inferences that can be
derived from individual data points. These inferences may be used to
construct particular social understandings, to route around the constraints of
positive privacy law, or to make classifications that are de facto linked to
sensitive attributes (or to emergent categories that may not receive formal
legal protections). And yet privacy law has not focused on these inferences,
despite critical scholars’ long-standing concern with the ability to
discriminate and stereotype through data-driven analysis.134 ML makes this
oversight especially glaring: it acts as a force multiplier of these concerns.
Whether seen as a difference in degree or a difference in kind, this strain on
the regulatory system warrants fresh consideration.

131

Id. at 376–77.
See id. at 394–98. I reserve further study of affinity profiling and American antidiscrimination
law for future work. For an early study of big data and discrimination in the employment context, see
generally Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671
(2016), which examines the various concerns surrounding data and algorithmic techniques in the context
of Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination in the employment sphere.
133 Wachter & Mittelstadt, Reasonable Inferences, supra note 129, at 56.
134 See OSCAR H. GANDY JR., THE PANOPTIC SORT: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PERSONAL
INFORMATION 1 (1993); see also Oscar H. Gandy Jr., Engaging Rational Discrimination: Exploring
Reasons for Placing Regulatory Constraints on Decision Support Systems, 12 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 29,
30–31 (2010) (“Some of the most troublesome candidates for regulatory exclusion or control are variables
that have a strong historically generated structural linkage with other measures that we have already
agreed to ban[,] . . . primarily . . . the measures of socioeconomic status and attainment that are closely
associated with indicators of race, ethnicity, and gender.”).
132
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Machine learning amplifies context and classification challenges that
make it nearly impossible for individuals to control their data in order to
control their privacy. Yet the contemporary suite of linear information
privacy protections depends on individual control. The next Section suggests
that economic and technological factors historically provided additional
protection of information privacy interests. Shifts in these underlying,
implicit constraints matter because firms and organizations that can obtain
the resources to construct ML models gain the potential for enhanced
inferential power that de jure information privacy protections do not address.
B. Data’s Potential, Amplified
ML’s challenge to the information privacy protective regime occurs
because of a convergence of factors that unlock access to otherwise
unavailable (or unaffordable) data, coupled with incentives to process that
data and generate predictions. This section analyzes the shifts in technology
and society that have allowed the power of ML-driven inferences to emerge.
1. What Machine Learning Derives from Data
ML routes around existing information privacy protections by changing
the kinds of information that organizations can derive from collected data in
two important senses. First, certain activities were historically too costly, too
difficult, or both too costly and too difficult to accomplish. Take, by way of
example, facial recognition to identify an unknown person. This task requires
obtaining and aggregating configurations of biometric markers, such as the
distance between a person’s nose and chin and myriad other facial
measurements, to make educated guesses about similar “faceprint”
configurations and thereby generate an identity match.135 Criminologists
started aggregating these measurements by hand in the late nineteenth
century, and over forty years ago mathematician Woody Bledsoe tried to
teach a computer to use this method to match mugshots to suspects’ faces.136
But this process was hard to do in a cost-effective way.
Automation changes the calculus. And once it becomes amply efficient
and affordable to use an ML technique for a task like face recognition, there
135

See Shaun Raviv, The Secret History of Facial Recognition, WIRED (Jan. 21, 2020, 6:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/secret-history-facial-recognition [https://perma.cc/P5AW-HSR4].
136
Id.; Inioluwa Deborah Raji & Genevieve Fried, About Face: A Survey of Facial Recognition
Evaluation, ARXIV (Feb. 1, 2021), https://arxiv.org/abs/2102.00813 [https://perma.cc/A46C-4KTE]; see
also Karen Hao, This Is How We Lost Control of Our Faces, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 5, 2021),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/02/05/1017388/ai-deep-learning-facial-recognition-datahistory [https://perma.cc/T2QZ-2QVD] (providing a more recent history of facial recognition
technology).
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is an eroded barrier to further, potentially privacy-invasive inferences. For
instance, having located a face match, the match may then be used both to
identify a person and to infer other information about the identified
individual. Imagine an abusive ex-lover who posted a nude photo of their
former significant other online. If that individual is walking down the street
and is identified with facial recognition technology, then it is possible to,
from their presence in public, connect them back to the nude photograph and,
potentially, make all sorts of other inferences—warranted or not—about
them. ML may accordingly enable the derivation of other kinds of
information by enabling a cost-effective categorization that can then be
associated with other information in the world.
In a second set of circumstances, ML’s pattern-matching capabilities
may themselves generate information that it was not previously possible to
discern. Take, for instance, technology that purports to identify rare genetic
disorders using a photograph of an individual’s face.137 Here, the technology
is used to infer that the mapping of that person’s facial biometrics is
sufficiently similar to the faceprint of individuals with particular genetic
syndromes.138 ML may accordingly serve as more than the enabling
technology: it can operate as a new kind of inferential pathway that reveals
previously hidden information that is latent in an aggregated set of data.139
ML thus provides distinct enabling and epistemic pathways, allowing
organizations and firms to infer information that people do not reveal, based
on other data points.140 The current statutory and regulatory tack does
not account for the potential to draw inferences in this way.141 By unlocking
new ways that data matter in the world, ML changes what is possible for a
given actor to do in a particular setting.142 Working out what the legal
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Gurovich et al., supra note 114, at 60, 63.
See id.
139 See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar & Aziz Z. Huq, Privacy’s Political Economy and the State of
Machine Learning: An Essay in Honor of Stephen J. Schulhofer, 76 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 317, 328
(2021) (“[M]achine learning can be used to expand the range of data that is epistemically fruitful.”).
140 See supra Section II.A.
141 See Michael Kassner, Unintended Inferences: The Biggest Threat to Data Privacy and
Cybersecurity, TECHREPUBLIC (Mar. 10, 2019, 8:32 PM), https://www.techrepublic.com/article/
unintended-inferences-the-biggest-threat-to-data-privacy-and-cybersecurity
[https://perma.cc/S7QPVTDX] (describing the threat of “unintended inferences” and noting the need for legal protections against
them); Wachter & Mittelstadt, Reasonable Inferences, supra note 129, at 542–71 (assessing the lack of
robust protection for inferences under EU law). For a discussion of the CCPA’s limited exception to this
general rule, see supra text accompanying notes 69–71.
142 In the Fourth Amendment context, the Supreme Court has recognized how technological change
affects societal privacy expectations. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018)
(finding that certain “digital data—personal location information maintained by a third party—d[id] not
138
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response should be requires confronting who can exploit the technology and
to what effect.
2. Who Can Capitalize on Machine Learning
The question of who can exploit data through ML models is bound up
in an antecedent one: who has access to data and the means to process it into
information? Technology law scholars have long observed that, when it
comes to digital governance, forces beyond the law can matter at least as
much as formal legal regulations. As Joel Reidenberg and Lawrence Lessig
argued in the late 1990s, the digital realm is a zone of “Lex Informatica” in
which regulatory constraints and affordances emerge from design choices
about digital programming as much as from formal law.143 “Code is law.”144
Building on this understanding, Harry Surden has contended that
privacy interests are protected by “latent structural constraints.” These
constraints act as “regulators of behavior that prevent conduct through
technological or physical barriers in the world,” and which are “by-products
of the technological or physical state of the world, rather than the result of
design.”145 They operate as nonlegal mechanisms that constrain conduct in
ways that “reliably prohibit unwanted behavior.”146 For example, the fact that
mere mortals cannot see through a wall, at least without relying on
technologically mediated X-ray capabilities, operates as a latent structural
constraint that reliably prohibits people from seeing into their neighbors’
homes.147 Economic factors in particular act as an essential constraint: if the
“physical and technological costs imposed by the current state of the world”
fit neatly under existing precedents”); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393 (2014) (asserting that
analogizing a “search of all data stored on a cellphone” to searches of physical items “is like saying a
ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon”); United States v. Jones,
565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (taking particular attributes of GPS monitoring into
account “when considering the existence of a reasonable societal expectation of privacy in the sum of
one’s public movements”).
143 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0, at 5–7 (2006); Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The
Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 554–55 (1998); see
also James Grimmelmann, Note, Regulation by Software, 114 YALE L.J. 1719, 1732–45 (2005) (assessing
software as a regulatory modality).
144 LESSIG, supra note 143, at 5 (first citing WILLIAM J. MITCHELL, CITY OF BITS 111 (1995); and
then citing Reidenberg, supra note 143, at 555). Under this model, law, norms, markets, and digital
architecture (“code”) operate as regulatory forces that can constrain “some action, or policy, whether
intended by anyone or not.” Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 662 n.1
(1998). For further discussion of this early understanding of regulatory forces in cyberlaw, see Alicia
Solow-Niederman, Administering Artificial Intelligence, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 633, 646–48 (2020).
145 Harry Surden, Structural Rights in Privacy, 60 SMU L. REV. 1605, 1607–08 (2007).
146 Id. at 1607.
147 As Harry Surden explains, this category of regulatory constraint is “conceptually similar to an
initial distribution of legal entitlements” under Wesley Hohfield’s formulation of rights and entitlements.
See id. at 1608, 1611.
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fall, then the constraining protection may fall alongside it.148 Latent
constraints needed to fall for ML-driven inferences to emerge. Because ML
is best understood not as a fixed technology, but rather as a utility, it’s more
helpful to think in terms of the resources to develop it.149 And just as
generating a utility like electricity requires resources and capital—picture a
turbine that requires a moving fluid and a series of blades affixed to a rotor
shaft150—so too does ML generation require certain resource inputs.
Two especially critical ML resources are computing power and data.151
Access to computing power, or “compute,” and access to data affect privacy
regulation because, as building blocks for ML tools, their scarcity or
abundance determines which institutional actors can generate inferences
about people. Take, first, compute. When computer scientist Alan Turing
suggested that humans attempt to build intelligent machines in the 1950s,152
his vision was not possible in part because the computers of the era did not
have the hardware capability to store commands153 and the cost of running a
computer was prohibitive.154 Computing in general, and ML in particular,
progressed only with advances in hardware.155 Much of the theory to support
advanced ML techniques was actually generated in the 1980s and 1990s.
Notably, although computer scientist Geoffrey Hinton began working with
the now-leading method known as deep learning nearly thirty years ago,
148

Id. at 1608 n.12.
Solow-Niederman, supra note 144, at 655 (explaining that AI is “akin to electricity, not a lamp”).
The inferences generated by an ML model are not end products on their own; rather, they must be applied
in the context of a particular application or decision-making tool.
150 See Electricity Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 1, 2021), https://www.eia.gov/
energyexplained/electricity/how-electricity-is-generated.php [https://perma.cc/EH9Y-GYTF].
151 Solow-Niederman, supra note 144, at 688 & n.248; see also Nick Srnicek, Data, Compute,
Labour, ADA LOVELACE INST. (June 30, 2020), https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/blog/datacompute-labour [https://perma.cc/BTA3-B6AE] (identifying compute, data, and labor as
three categories of resource needs for AI); Karen Hao, AI Pioneer Geoff Hinton: “Deep
Learning Is Going to Be Able to Do Everything,” MIT TECH. REV. (Nov. 3, 2020),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/11/03/1011616/ai-godfather-geoffrey-hinton-deep-learningwill-do-everything [https://perma.cc/B6BR-HSE3] (reporting that the effectiveness of the now-leading
ML method known as “deep learning” had long “been limited by a lack of data and computational
power”).
152 See generally A.M. Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 59 MIND 433 (1950)
(discussing the potential for intelligent machines and exploring how machines could learn to think).
153 Rockwell Anyoha, The History of Artificial Intelligence, SITNBOSTON (Aug. 28, 2017),
https://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2017/history-artificial-intelligence [https://perma.cc/7UR6-RWNB].
154 Id.; Robert Garner, Early Popular Computers, 1950 –1970, ENG’G & TECH. HIST. WIKI (Jan. 8,
2018, 4:13 PM), http://ethw.org/Early_Popular_Computers,_1950_-_1970#Early_solid-state_computers
[https://perma.cc/3PED-VXL6].
155 In particular, Moore’s Law, or the rule of thumb that the number of transistors that it is possible
to put on a single computing chip doubles every two years, has improved processing time and driven
down the cost of building more advanced computers. See David Rotman, The End of the Greatest
Prediction on Earth, 123 MIT TECH. REV. 10, 10, 12 (2020).
149

391

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

implementing these techniques remained impossible without adequate
compute.156 In 2012, thanks to computing advances, Hinton and his graduate
students brought deep-learning methods to fruition by applying the technique
to classify over one million images with a historically unparalleled error
rate.157 Fast compute was necessary to unlock “neural networks” as a
viable method.158
Critically, computing power of the necessary magnitude is not
inexpensive or widely distributed. On the contrary, it is inaccessible for
many public and private actors, and risks centralizing ML development in
platform firms.159 Determining what this fact means for data analysis and for
information privacy protections requires accounting for another essential
resource: the data itself.
All the compute in the world would not power ML unless coupled with
access to adequate data.160 That’s because ML relies on access to extremely
large datasets to derive patterns.161 The past few decades have provided just
such access in spades.162 As one example, consider a form of data that is
especially important in controversial ML applications: faces. It’s now far
easier to collect a large number of facial images in the manner required to
156 See Hao, supra note 151; Cade Metz, Finally, Neural Networks that Actually Work, WIRED (Apr.
21, 2015, 5:45 AM), https://www.wired.com/2015/04/jeff-dean [https://perma.cc/VYD4-YDH8].
157 Alex Krizhevsky, Ilya Sutskever & Geoffrey E. Hinton, ImageNet Classification with Deep
Convolutional Neural Networks, in NEURAL INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEMS, ADVANCES IN
NEURAL INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEMS 25: 26TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON NEURAL
INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEMS 2012, at 1097 (2012).
158 See Nicholas Thompson, An AI Pioneer Explains the Evolution of Neural Networks, WIRED (May
13, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/ai-pioneer-explains-evolution-neural-networks
[https://perma.cc/AL58-V23M] (interviewing Geoffrey Hinton, who stated that “in the ’90s . . . data sets
were quite small and computers weren’t that fast”).
159 See Solow-Niederman, supra note 144, at 676 & n.203; see also Steve Lohr, At Tech’s Leading
Edge, Worry About a Concentration of Power, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/26/technology/ai-computer-expense.html [https://perma.cc/KT4LAXXJ] (reporting on computer scientists’ concerns that the mounting cost of AI research requires “giant
data centers” and leaves “fewer people with easy access to the [requisite] computing firepower”). In
a future project, (De)Platforming Artificial Intelligence, I plan to explore this risk of centralization in
more detail.
160 See Thompson, supra note 158 (noting the importance of both fast compute and access to data
for neural networks). In theory, technological advances that require less data could abate, but not remove,
this dynamic. For a discussion of the importance of technological changes in regulatory analysis, see infra
text accompanying notes 274–278.
161 See Karen Hao, What Is Machine Learning?, MIT TECH. REV. (Nov. 17, 2018),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2018/11/17/103781/what-is-machine-learning-we-drew-youanother-flowchart [https://perma.cc/YN3Y-PAHW]. As Hao notes, “there are technically ways to
perform machine learning on smallish amounts of data, but you typically need huge piles of it to achieve
good results.” Id. “One-shot” or “zero-shot” learning that would train ML models with less data remains
by and large elusive. See infra note 277 and accompanying text.
162 Kapczynski, supra note 16, at 1462.
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develop a facial recognition tool. That’s a critical shift because, as a recent
survey by data scientists Deborah Raji and Genevieve Fried illustrates,
access to data has long de facto regulated facial recognition attempts. Indeed,
early efforts to computerize facial recognition were thwarted in part by the
challenge of obtaining enough data.163
That’s no longer the case. The push for more and more data to support
deep learning increasingly led researchers to scrape the internet,164 amassing
datasets that included images from platforms such as Google Image search,
YouTube, Flickr, and Yahoo News.165 Nonetheless, even with more data
from the “wild,” new technical approaches remained unable to identify
individuals in real-world settings, where, for example, a face might be tilted
at an angle or the lighting might be dim.166
What changed was the fusion of data and compute, which generated
mounting incentives both to collect data and to exploit available data. By
2014, researchers at Facebook had leveraged deep learning to develop a
proprietary “DeepFace” model. As Raji and Fried explain, this model was
“trained on an internal dataset composed of images from Facebook profile
images,” and reportedly labeled “four million facial images belonging to
more than 4,000 identities.”167 Facebook’s access to data and computing
power permitted it to achieve best-in-class accuracy at a level on a par with
human performance.168 Spurred by the allure of further advances, other face
datasets kept growing in size “to accommodate the growing data
requirements to train deep learning models.”169 The push to commercialize
the technology mounted, too. Over time, as the field became competitive and
datasets continued to expand, collection techniques also shifted: in the period
running from 2014 to 2019, web sources made up almost 80% of the data
included in face datasets.170 At least for sufficiently well-resourced actors,
previously controlling data and compute constraints no longer apply.

163

Raji & Fried, supra note 136.
Hao, supra note 136 (discussing the About Face survey); see also Richard Van Noorden, The
Ethical Questions That Haunt Facial-Recognition Research, 587 NATURE 354, 355 (2020) (reporting the
growing trend, in the past decade, of scientists collecting face data without consent).
165 Raji & Fried, supra note 136.
166 Id.
167 Id. (citing Yaniv Taigman, Ming Yang, Marc’Aurelio Ranzato & Lior Wolf, DeepFace:
Closing the Gap to Human-Level Performance in Face Verification, 2014 IEEE CONF. ON COMPUT.
VISION & PATTERN RECOGNITION 1701, 1701–05, https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6909616
[https://perma.cc/DBR2-LAVW]).
168 See id.
169 Id.
170 Hao, supra note 136 (charting facial recognition data source distribution by era); see Raji & Fried,
supra note 136.
164
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3. What Data and Compute Incentivize
The shifts in facial recognition development are an example of a more
generalizable pattern concerning which kinds of actors have the ability and
the incentive to take advantage of data and compute resources and generate
ML instruments. Initially, a lack of compute power and a lack of data prevent
a particular technological method. These stopgaps serve as a constraint that,
functionally, prevents intrusion on certain privacy interests.171 Subsequently,
there are pushes to amass data. In the case of facial recognition, it was the
government that initially contributed to this effort.172 In other domains, longstanding commercial drives to amass data for marketing and targeting
purposes suffice to generate sufficiently large datasets.173 In each case, the
data that is collected is available in the wild or scraped despite the ostensible
protection of terms of service. In each case, the relative cost of data falls
because it is so readily accessible. Firms and organizations spend less and
stand to gain more from data collection.
Then, the second key resource, compute, also changes. Specifically,
new processing power opens up opportunities to discern inferences from
this data. There is, at some time, sufficient commercial allure that a large
firm internalizes and analyzes data sources174 or obtains data aggregated by
other firms.175 As firms in other sectors see the prospect of similar gains,
there are mounting incentives to acquire data and apply the technology
in more spheres of life. Firms and organizations that can acquire data and
afford access to compute stand to gain more, comparatively speaking, from
data processing.
Changes in access to resources, in short, both erode implicit privacy
protections and affect which institutional actors can leverage ML-powered
inferential predictions. These problems become even more acute as it

171 See Surden, supra note 145, at 1611 (describing how physical and economic facts about the world
can generate a particular Hohfeldian configuration of privacy entitlements).
172 Raji & Fried, supra note 136 (describing a $6.5 million government project to generate a dataset
of faces consisting of images from photoshoots).
173 See, e.g., Joseph Turow, Shhhh, They’re Listening: Inside the Coming Voice-Profiling Revolution,
FAST CO. (May 3, 2021), https://www.fastcompany.com/90630669/future-of-marketing-voice-profiling
[https://perma.cc/4ULP-NSC8] (warning that ML “voice profiling,” using recordings from consumer
calls, is the next frontier of marketing efforts).
174 Facebook’s DeepFace model epitomizes this dynamic. See supra text accompanying notes 167–
168; see also Amanda Levendowski, How Copyright Law Can Fix Artificial Intelligence’s Implicit Bias
Problem, 93 WASH. L. REV. 579, 606 (2018) (citing Strandburg, supra note 92, at 10) (describing
Facebook’s “build-it” model, which “amass[es] training data from users in exchange for a service those
users want”).
175 IBM’s “Diversity in Faces” dataset epitomizes this model. See Vance v. Amazon.com Inc., 525 F.
Supp. 3d 1301, 1306 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 15, 2021) (describing how IBM obtained data from Flickr to
generate a new dataset, which it then made available to other companies).
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becomes harder and harder for the individuals tasked with controlling their
own information privacy to discern which bits of data might be worth
protecting from would-be collectors or for other, third-party individuals to
anticipate how they might be affected by correlative models produced by
information processors with data collected from other people.
*

*

*

In the face of ML’s challenges to the information privacy regime, one
option is inertia: let the force of the historic trajectory continue to propel us,
and trust that we’ll muddle through. But muddling through requires ignoring
the ways in which applications of ML sustain and accelerate an inference
economy. In the inference economy, the cost of data access is comparatively
lower. And the potential future informational benefit that firms or
organizations might realize from using ML to leverage the data at an
aggregate level is comparatively higher. Data fuels the economy176: as we
have seen, the ML-driven products of the inference economy rely on
individual data. Individuals, however, cannot effectively control for the
consequences of how their data is used. It’s not even clear that the label “their
data” identifies a coherent category in the same way.177 The next Part
contends that even would-be reformers fail to recognize the nature of the
challenges that ML presents, setting the stage for Part IV’s proposal for a
strategic reframing.
III. THE LIMITS OF PROPOSED REFORMS
This Part argues that most of the information privacy legislative reforms
on the table do not engage with the deeper question of how organizations
with the capacity and resources to create ML tools are situated relative to
individuals. These proposals therefore arrive at a solution that is, at best,
incomplete.178 They generally follow one of two stylized models: one,
176 See COHEN, supra note 17, at 48 (classifying data as quasi-capital, and identifying “data flows
extracted from people” as “raw material in the political economy of informational capitalism” (emphasis
omitted)); see also Jathan Sadowski, When Data Is Capital: Datafication, Accumulation, and Extraction,
6 BIG DATA & SOC’Y 1, 2 (2019) (discussing “data capital”); Viljoen, supra note 13, at 578 (discussing
data’s “de facto status as quasi capital”).
177 See supra Section II.A.
178 See JOHN DEWEY, LOGIC: THE THEORY OF INQUIRY 108 (1938) (“The way in which the problem
is conceived decides what specific suggestions are entertained and which are dismissed; what data are
selected and which rejected; it is the criterion for relevancy and irrelevancy of hypotheses and conceptual
structures.”); see also Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for
Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1399 (2001) (“As [historian] John Dewey aptly said, ‘a
problem well put is half-solved.’” (quoting DEWEY, supra, at 108)); cf. ALLIE BROSH, SOLUTIONS AND
OTHER PROBLEMS (2020) (suggesting the relationship between problems and solutions is not always as
clear as one might expect).
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generate stronger information privacy laws that continue to rely on
individual control; or two, constrain the use of, or outright ban, particularly
problematic kinds of technologies.
Take option one: recognize the importance of data in contemporary
information privacy and expand existing legal protections through
comprehensive (as opposed to merely sectoral) legislation.179 As an
illustrative set, consider the 116th Congress, which convened from January
2019 to January 2021180 and featured a score of comprehensive (also
sometimes called “omnibus”) information privacy statutes181 alongside a
bevy of bills that emphasize a particular aspect of information privacy, such
as personal data related to COVID-19182 or personal information shared
through digital channels.183 Many of the proposals shift away from the
traditional consumer protection model of U.S. law and toward a data
protection model.184 That step, and other shifts towards comprehensive
statutes, might be a valuable tactic insofar as the problem is inadequate in
breadth for sectoral regulation.
179 Because this Article concerns U.S. information privacy as it is regulated at the national level, I
focus my discussion on federal law and invoke state law only insofar as it is relevant to draw out the
contours of the argument. The analysis that follows does not discuss the 117th Congress’s draft proposal
for a federal omnibus privacy bill, which was introduced after this Article was finalized for publication.
See supra note 8.
180 Signe Carey, Introduction: 116th United States Congress: A Survey of Books Written by
Members, LIBR. CONG. (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.guides.loc.gov/116th-congress-book-list
[https://perma.cc/S4PM-VM6B].
181 See, e.g., Consumer Data Privacy and Security Act of 2020, S. 3456, 116th Cong. (2020); Data
Broker Accountability and Transparency Act of 2020, H.R. 6675, 116th Cong. (2020); American Data
Dissemination Act of 2019, S. 142, 116th Cong. (2019); Consumer Online Privacy Rights Act, S. 2968,
116th Cong. (2019); Data Care Act of 2019, S. 2961, 116th Cong. (2019); Designing Accounting
Safeguards to Help Broaden Oversight and Regulations on Data Act, S. 1951, 116th Cong. (2019); Do
Not Track Act, S. 1578, 116th Cong. (2019); Mind Your Own Business Act of 2019, S. 2637, 116th Cong.
(2019); Online Privacy Act of 2019, H.R. 4978, 116th Cong. (2019); Privacy Bill of Rights Act, S. 1214,
116th Cong. (2019); Setting an American Framework to Ensure Data Access, Transparency, and
Accountability Act, S. 4626, 116th Cong. (2019).
182 See, e.g., COVID–19 Consumer Data Protection Act of 2020, S. 3663, 116th Cong. (2020);
Exposure Notification Privacy Act, S. 3861, 116th Cong. (2020).
183 See, e.g., Privacy Score Act of 2020, H.R. 6227, 116th Cong. § 2(a)(1), (b)(1) (2020) (requiring
the FTC to “develop a framework for assessing the privacy practices of interactive computer services”
and “develop a system for issuing a [privacy] score for an interactive computer service”); Social Media
Privacy Protection and Consumer Rights Act of 2019, S. 189, 116th Cong. § 3(a)(1)(A) (2019) (requiring
“the operator of [an] online platform” to provide users with ex ante notification that “personal data of the
user produced during the online behavior . . . will be collected and used by the operator and third parties”).
184 Some scholars attribute this shift to the influence of the European Union’s General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR). See, e.g., Hartzog & Richards, supra note 53, at 1694 (arguing that the
GDPR has “ motivat[ed] European and American companies to devote significant resources to privacy
and creat[ed] structures to accommodate data subjects’ rights”). Others argue that it is due to the
“catalyzing” effect of the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (CCPA). See Chander et al., supra
note 3, at 1734–37.
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But these interventions, in the main, continue to rely on the same
solution of individual control.185 That tendency may reflect economic
motives,186 political dynamics,187 sheer inertia,188 or some complex
combination of these and other factors. Regardless of the root cause, as Julie
Cohen emphasizes, the reality is that “[m]ost of the bills introduced in the
116th Congress begin by assigning sets of control rights to consumers.”189
They embrace new versions of the same approach, rooted in individual
consent to data collection and processing—despite an extensive literature
detailing the problems with that tack.190 The dominant approach does not
engage with the challenge of identifying who has amassed data and who has
the capacity to make inferences with data, and to what effect. Bills that
incorporate other tactics, such as imposing duties of loyalty on online service
providers, are outliers.191
Proponents of option two—constrain or ban the use of particular
technologies or the use of particular categories of data—come closer to
grappling with which entities have the power to affect individuals in the
inference economy. As one example, consider proposed or enacted bans on
185

See supra Part I.
See, e.g., Hartzog, supra note 48, at 959 (suggesting that the FIPs likely took root for economic
reasons and arguing that “[t]he ‘control’ conceptualization of privacy is built for globalization of the
data trade”).
187 See, e.g., PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 177–86 (1995) (examining Congress, privacy, and policy decisions, arguing that
“[p]rivacy as an idea has not had a powerful influence on policy making” and assessing the role of
interests in information privacy policymaking).
188 For discussion of the long-standing centrality of this control-centered model, see supra Part I.
189 COHEN, supra note 13, at 4; see also Waldman, supra note 20 (manuscript at 30) (documenting
how even seeming innovations in recent proposed statutes continue to “reflect long-standing privacy-ascontrol discourse and practices”). For a discussion of the notice-and-choice regime and how it relies on
individual control, see supra Part I.
190 See, e.g., Solove, supra note 46, at 1882–93 (arguing that “privacy self-management faces several
problems that together demonstrate that this paradigm alone cannot serve as the centerpiece of a viable
privacy regulatory regime”).
191 Senator Brian Schatz’s Data Care Act, for instance, would impose duties of care, loyalty, and
confidentiality on online-service providers that collect and process “individual identifying data” from
users. The bill also includes provisions to extend those duties to third-party organizations with whom an
online-service provider shares the covered data. See Data Care Act of 2019, S. 2961, 116th Cong. § 3
(2020). Putting to the side debates concerning the viability and wisdom of such duties, see, e.g., Lina M.
Khan & David E. Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries, 133 HARV. L. REV. 497, 501
(2019) (arguing that an information fiduciary model both contains internal weaknesses that it cannot
resolve and raises other problems), and even assuming arguendo that they are a good solution, they are
not a silver bullet. Briefly, such a set of fiduciary-inspired duties relies on an explicit agreement between
the initial user and the initial data collector as well as a relationship between the entity that is collecting
the data and the entity that is processing the data. But these baseline conditions do not map neatly onto
all of the organizational relationships in the inference economy. For more detailed analysis of the more
complex relationships at play, what such duties might (not) do with respect to regulating inferences, and
how such duties might be part of a regulatory toolkit, see infra Section IV.B.
186
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the use of facial recognition technology.192 Responding in part to mounting
evidence that facial recognition systems give higher false-positive rates for
people of color, a growing movement aims to ban the use of the technology.
A growing number of local, state, and federal legislators have proposed or
enacted regulations to limit use. Especially insofar as these technologies
have inequitable racial effects193 or are used by law enforcement officers in
ways that contravene best practices,194 such bans may be a much needed
policy intervention.
192

For a summary of state legislation, see Nicole Sakin, Will There Be Federal Facial Recognition
Regulation in the US?, IAPP (Feb. 11, 2021), https://iapp.org/news/a/u-s-facial-recognition-roundup
[https://perma.cc/N76V-JTZS]. In addition, in June 2021, Maine enacted a statute strictly regulating facial
recognition use by public employees and public officials. See Jake Holland, Maine Law Curtails Facial
Recognition Use by Government, Police, BLOOMBERG L. (July 1, 2021, 11:16 AM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/tech-and-telecom-law/maine-law-curtails-facial-recognition-use-bygovernment-police [https://perma.cc/347U-H2SW]. For a summary of enacted local regulations, see
Nathan Sheard & Adam Schwartz, The Movement to Ban Government Use of Face Recognition, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND. (May 5, 2022), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/05/movement-ban-governmentuse-face-recognition [https://perma.cc/AP44-MLGW]. For a discussion of enacted and proposed local
regulations, see Susan Crawford, Facial Recognition Laws Are (Literally) All Over the Map, WIRED (Dec.
16, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/facial-recognition-laws-are-literally-all-over-the-map
[https://perma.cc/8MZS-DSEW].
For a discussion of state-level initiatives, see Pollyanna Sanderson, Privacy Trends: Four State Bills
to Watch That Diverge from California and Washington Models, FUTURE PRIV. F. (May 25, 2021),
https://fpf.org/blog/privacy-trends-four-state-bills-to-watch-that-diverge-from-california-andwashington-models [https://perma.cc/BCS9-FZRB], and Pam Greenberg, Spotlight | Facial Recognition
Gaining Measured Acceptance, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept. 18, 2020),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/facial-recognitiongaining-measured-acceptance-magazine2020.aspx [https://perma.cc/335W-NYTR]. Nearly 40% of
states considered bills to limit use of biometric technologies by government or by commercial entities in
the year 2020, and Washington regulates facial recognition by government actors. Id. For a proposed
federal statute to limit law enforcement use of facial recognition, introduced by Senator Edward Markey,
see Facial Recognition and Biometric Technology Moratorium Act of 2020, S. 4084, 116th Cong. (2020).
193 See Kashmir Hill, Another Arrest, and Jail Time, Due to a Bad Facial Recognition Match, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 6, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/29/technology/facial-recognition-misidentifyjail.html [https://perma.cc/9KUZ-8E79] (reporting on the third known instance of a Black man
wrongfully arrested based on an inaccurate facial recognition match); NIST Study Evaluates Effects of
Race, Age, Sex on Face Recognition Software, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH. (May 18, 2020),
https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2019/12/nist-study-evaluates-effects-race-age-sex-facerecognition-software [https://perma.cc/QJG6-Z9MZ] (documenting high rates of false positives for
Asians, African Americans, and Native groups in a set of 189 facial recognition algorithms); see also Joy
Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial
Gender Classification, PROC. MACH. LEARNING RSCH.: CONF. ON FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY, &
TRANSPARENCY, 2018, at 1, 12 (documenting higher error rates in the application of facial recognition
tools to darker-skinned women).
194 See Clare Garvie, Garbage in, Garbage out: Face Recognition on Flawed Data, GEO. L. CTR. ON
PRIV. & TECH. (May 16, 2019), https://www.flawedfacedata.com [https://perma.cc/5SCF-JHTU]
(reporting that one New York detective decided that a suspect resembled an actor; looked up the actor on
Google to obtain high-quality images; and then used images of the actor in lieu of the suspect’s face,
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Regardless of one’s stance on the merits, the tactic of constraining the
use of a particular kind of technology is not a strategy for information privacy
protection as a whole. Such a solution frames the problem in terms of how
to use law to prevent a technological outcome that is deemed undesirable.
This technology-versus-law showdown raises its own set of challenges. In
practical terms, a “tech-specific” move to “regulate a technology rather than
the conduct it enables” may quickly “become irrelevant with the advent of a
newer technology not covered by the law.”195 With technologies such as iris
recognition already reportedly in use by U.S. Customs and Border
Protection,196 not to mention emerging gait-recognition instruments that
could also pick up on information available whenever anyone steps out in
public,197 there is a risk of whack-a-mole as legislators update law to account
for rapid diffusion of technologies with similar risk profiles to facial
recognition,198 likely after they have already caused harms that direct public
attention to the technology. At bottom, a ban is a political solution: it may
succeed when there is adequate bottom-up mobilization or concern about
specific, articulated harms to enact a particular measure, but it is not a
broader legal strategy for a protective regulatory regime.

resulting in a “match” for a suspect whose own face had not turned up any results); Alfred Ng, Police Say
They Can Use Facial Recognition, Despite Bans, MARKUP (Jan. 28, 2021, 8:00 AM),
https://themarkup.org/news/2021/01/28/police-say-they-can-use-facial-recognition-despite-bans
[https://perma.cc/7PE4-MS4K] (describing cases in which law enforcement officers failed to disclose
their use of facial recognition technology in their police reports).
195 Rebecca Crootof & BJ Ard, Structuring Techlaw, 34 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 347, 368 (2021); see
also id. at 412 (noting the risk that tech-specific laws will “create legal gaps and underinclusive rules”).
196 See ENGSTROM ET AL., supra note 26, at 31–34; see also Press Release, Iris ID, Iris ID Products
Implemented at US-Mexico Border Crossing (Jan. 19, 2016), https://www.irisid.com/iris-id-productsimplemented-at-us-mexico-border-crossing [https://perma.cc/XG99-FC7X] (reporting a pilot program to
test iris scanning to identify noncitizens at the U.S.–Mexico land border).
197 See ROYAL SOC’Y, FORENSIC GAIT ANALYSIS: A PRIMER FOR COURTS 28 (2017) (discussing
biometric gait analysis). At least some EU constituencies have expressed concern with the use of any
biometric surveillance technologies in public spaces. See Press Release, Eur. Data Prot. Bd., EDPB &
EDPS Call for Ban on Use of AI for Automated Recognition of Human Features in Publicly Accessible
Spaces, and Some Other Uses of AI That Can Lead to Unfair Discrimination (June 21, 2021),
https://edpb.europa.eu/news/news/2021/edpb-edps-call-ban-use-ai-automated-recognition-humanfeatures-publicly-accessible_en [https://perma.cc/P8VD-GBEH] (calling for “a general ban on any use
of AI for automated recognition of human features in publicly accessible spaces, such as recognition
of faces, gait, fingerprints, DNA, voice, keystrokes and other biometric or behavioural signals, in
any context”).
198 Some proposed legislation regulates biometric data more generally. See, e.g., Facial Recognition
and Biometric Technology Moratorium Act of 2020, S. 4084, 116th Cong. (2020) (proposing a ban on
use of specified biometric systems, such as facial recognition, gait recognition, and voice recognition, by
federal or state government actors). Because this proposal would not apply to commercial uses of the
technology or local government actors, however, it leaves a broad swath of uses uncovered and does not
contend with the relationships between data collectors and data subjects in the commercial context. For a
different framing, see infra Part IV.
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Although some legislative interventions operate one level up and
regulate the category of data involved in facial recognition—biometric
data—these regulations embrace the individual-control model and run into
the same kinds of limitations as other interventions.199 Illinois’s Biometric
Information Privacy Act, a leading state statute, is a case in point.200
Constraining categories of a technology or categories of data advances a
solution to one set of problems, pegged to that particular technology or
category of data. It might be a smart tactic. But especially when it continues
to rely on a linear control approach to information privacy protections, it still
does not move closer to a strategy that accounts for who has the capacity or
incentive to draw inferences from data. The next Part proposes a different
approach.
IV. ACCOUNTING FOR THE INFERENCE ECONOMY
The inference economy imbues those who can collect data and those
who can process data into information with power. These entities obtain
informational power because of the inferences that they can make about
individuals. ML is the leading technological engine to generate the
information that gives firms and organizations power. To respond to these
dynamics, this Part argues that we need to focus attention on the relationships
between individuals and entities that leverage data, and not on individual
control of data itself. The inference economy is not a problem to be solved;
it is a reality to which to adapt. The most auspicious approach is to
understand data privacy dynamics as a triangle that consists of data
collectors, information processors, and individuals.
A. Recognizing Inferential Power
The information society. The information age. Surveillance capitalism.
Informational capitalism. These designations recognize a monumental shift
away from an economy driven by industrial capitalism and towards an
economy driven by information. But beneath the headline phrase, the
specific changes in resources that catalyze these shifts often get overlooked.
Informational capitalism, for instance, depends on a relationship between

199

Some European proposals avoid this problem by calling for more general bans. See, e.g., Press
Release, supra note 197. This proposal is grounded in EU legal understandings of data protection as a
fundamental right, which is distinct from the American consumer protection approach to information
privacy. See supra note 3. I reserve further analysis of the EU’s AI proposed regulatory package for
future work.
200 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(d) (2008) (requiring individual opt-in for biometric information or
identifiers); see Cohen, supra note 13, at 4 (describing the Biometric Information Privacy Act as
“adopt[ing] a control-rights-plus-opt-in-or-out approach”).
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data, information, and knowledge, structured by law.201 In Manuel Castells’s
formulation of informational capitalism, information is understood as “data
that have been organized and communicated.”202 As we have seen, ML’s
inferential capabilities change the ways that data can be organized to produce
value within a society. Indeed, in a world where anything in public is, in
theory, potential fuel for an algorithm, ML changes what it means to
communicate information in the first instance.
Shutting down dataflows wholesale in response to such changes is
neither feasible nor socially desirable.203 Data is not something to be stopped
at the level of the individual; rather, the challenge is structuring interventions
to check data’s power. Individual rights have their place. But individual
control, as we have seen, is a flawed privacy-protection paradigm. A
complementary structural strategy is needed.
Confronting data’s power at a structural level requires accepting that
good and bad uses are not self-defining. The informational products of the
inference economy can help as well as harm. Even outside of concerns about
surveillance capitalism or behavioral manipulation through advertising,
there are compelling harms. One leading instance is when ML-driven tools
serve up predictive results that have a disparate impact on alreadymarginalized populations when applied to distribute benefits or impose
burdens. Facial recognition instruments are a prime example; these
201
COHEN, supra note 1716, at 48 (“[D]ata flows extracted from people play an increasingly
important role as raw material in the political economy of informational capitalism.”); see also id. at 5–
6 (citing Castells’s definition of informational capitalism).
202 MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY 17 n.25 (2d ed. 2010) (quoting
MARC URI PORAT, OFF. OF TELECOMMS., THE INFORMATION ECONOMY: DEFINITION AND
MEASUREMENT 2 (1977)).
203 Some proposed interventions may face First Amendment challenges. Free speech’s relationship
to privacy is “long and complicated.” Neil M. Richards, Why Data Privacy Law Is (Mostly)
Constitutional, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1501, 1504 (2015). Despite this messy relationship, there is
enough unsettled that it is a mistake to use the First Amendment to foreclose a debate about what forms
of public regulation are optimal for the inference economy. For instance, whether particular data-driven
processes are speech in the first instance, and whether their regulation is able to withstand judicial
scrutiny, remains an open question. See Brief of Amici Law Professors in Opposition to Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss at 2, ACLU v. Clearview AI, Inc., No. 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 2, 2020)
(arguing that Clearview AI’s facial-analysis technique is best understood as an “industrial process” that
does not implicate speech rights (citing Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264, 1268 (9th Cir. 2019))).
That’s especially true because different kinds of information practices, such as data collection versus
analysis versus use, raise different kinds of First Amendment considerations. Jack M. Balkin, Information
Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183, 1194 (2016) (citing Neil M.
Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1181–82 (2005)).
Precisely because of the complexity of the relationship and the need for careful analysis of the kind of
regulation at issue and the work that underlying theories of the First Amendment do in reconciling any
tension, it’s too hasty to assert that any regulation that affects what an actor may or may not do with data
is unconstitutional. Whether or not a given intervention affects protected speech at all depends on careful,
context-specific analysis, as well as the details of how a regulation is tailored.

401

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

technologies are now discussed at least as much in the language of civil
rights as in privacy discourse.
This sort of harm can be subtler, too. Take, for instance, a hospital’s
turn to ML to determine which patients should receive extra medical care.204
The hope was that identifying patterns in medical data would allow the
hospital to make better predictions about health needs.205 Instead, the running
model’s “prediction on health needs [wa]s, in fact, a prediction on health
costs.”206 And because it relied on past healthcare spending to assess need,
and because, “[a]t a given level of health,” Black patients generated lower
costs than white patients, the running model undercounted the actual needs
of Black patients.207 The inferential patterns drawn from the data in this
healthcare setting hurt those most in need. In other healthcare settings and in
many other instances, the applied use of ML risks embedding long-standing
racial and socioeconomic inequity.208
The relationship between equity and ML is not quite so simple, though.
Tools can also expose hidden discrimination in social systems. Racial
inequity in healthcare is one such problem.209 Racial disparities in physician
assessment of pain are a well-known example.210 In particular, knee
osteoarthritis disproportionately affects people of color, yet traditional
measurement techniques tend to miss physical causes of pain in these
populations.211 To counter this outcome, a research team developed a new
ML approach that is able to scan X-rays and better predict actual patient pain.
204

See Carolyn Y. Johnson, Racial Bias in a Medical Algorithm Favors White Patients over Sicker
Black Patients, WASH. POST (Oct. 24, 2019, 2:00 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/
2019/10/24/racial-bias-medical-algorithm-favors-white-patients-over-sicker-black-patients
[https://perma.cc/WD4R-A3G6].
205 Ziad Obermeyer, Brian Powers, Christine Vogeli & Sendhil Mullainathan, Dissecting Racial Bias
in an Algorithm Used to Manage the Health of Populations, 336 SCIENCE 447, 449 (2019).
206 Id.
207 Id. at 449–50.
208 This risk is especially acute in the criminal justice context. See, e.g., Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In,
Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2224 (2019) (assessing racial inequality in algorithmic risk assessment);
Aziz Z. Huq, Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal Justice, 68 DUKE L.J. 1043, 1045 (2019) (assessing
how algorithmic criminal justice affects racial equity).
209 See William J. Hall, Mimi V. Chapman, Kent M. Lee, Yesenia M. Merino, Tainayah W. Thomas,
B. Keith Payne, Eugenia Eng, Steven H. Day & Tamera Coyne-Beasley, Implicit Racial/Ethnic Bias
Among Health Care Professionals and Its Influence on Health Care Outcomes: A Systematic Review,
105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH e60, e61 (2015).
210 Kelly M. Hoffman, Sophie Trawalter, Jordan R. Axt & M. Norman Oliver, Racial Bias in Pain
Assessment and Treatment Recommendations, and False Beliefs About Biological Differences Between
Blacks and Whites, 113 PNAS 4296 (2016), https://www.pnas.org/doi/epdf/10.1073/pnas.1516047113
[https://perma.cc/B46M-DWZB].
211 Emma Pierson, David M. Cutler, Jure Leskovec, Sendhil Mullainathan & Ziad Obermeyer, An
Algorithmic Approach to Reducing Unexplained Pain Disparities in Underserved Populations,
27 NATURE MED. 136, 136 (2021).
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This applied use of ML narrowed health inequities by deriving inferential
patterns that help those most in need.212
The valence of still other cases, moreover, is mixed. Another healthcare
example is illustrative: the use of ML to analyze more than three million
Facebook messages and over 140,000 Facebook images and predict “signals
associated with psychiatric illness.”213 This study revealed, for instance, that
individuals with mood disorders tend to post images with more blues and
fewer yellows, and that “netspeak” such as “lol” or “btw” was used much
more by individuals with schizophrenia spectrum disorder.214 On the one
hand, such insights might identify individuals with psychiatric illness earlier,
thereby helping them to obtain early intervention services associated with
better outcomes. On the other hand, limiting the impact of such insights to
“consented patients receiving psychiatric care” is likely to be more difficult
than the researchers anticipate.215 For example, a firm might arrive at similar
results if it instead relied on statements about illness made in another setting,
such as an online discussion group to support individuals, and paired the
statements with social media photographs.216 Granted, that model could not
be said to have clinical validity, but it would still permit a prediction of status
based on the correlation of bits of data—images and text—that were shared
in a different context.217 Moreover, the result holds the potential to affect
third parties to whom the model is applied to make predictive inferences
about them, even if these third parties have not made any public statements
about their illness.218 Reasonable minds can differ on whether, on net, this
outcome is good or bad.
Asking whether a tool helps or harms is the wrong question. The better
set of questions is: who does the tool purport to help, with what costs, and
how are the costs and benefits distributed?219 The next Section offers a
restructured framework for understanding these dynamics and more
effectively tailoring interventions.
212

Id. at 136–37, 139.
Michael L. Birnbaum, Raquel Norel, Anna Van Meter, Asra F. Ali, Elizabeth Arenare, Elif
Eyigoz, Carla Agurto, Nicole Germano, John M. Kane & Guillermo A. Cecchi, Identifying Signals
Associated with Psychiatric Illness Utilizing Language and Images Posted to Facebook, NPJ
SCHIZOPHRENIA, Dec. 2020, at 1, 1.
214 Id. at 3.
215
Id. at 1.
216 Id. (noting myriad such studies and lamenting their lack of clinical validity).
217 For a discussion of the context challenge, see supra Section II.A.1.
218 For a discussion of the classification challenge, see supra Section II.A.2.
219 See Balkin, supra note 30, at 27; see also Jack M. Balkin, The Path of Robotics Law, 6 CALIF. L.
REV. CIR. 45, 49 (2015) (“[T]he most important lesson of cyberlaw for robotics is the need to attend to
the relationships between affordance and imagination, between tools and relations of power, between
technological substrate and social use.”).
213

403

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

B. Triangulating Information Privacy in the Inference Economy
This Section argues that most proposed privacy reforms contain an
unrecognized structural flaw: they do not appreciate the triangular nature of
information privacy dynamics, which ML puts in especially stark relief.
Start with the dominant linear approach to American information
privacy protections, as applied to the above examples of bad and good
healthcare uses. In the case of the hospital that wanted to assess patient need,
patients consented to disclose data to a hospital; that hospital (1) had the data,
in its own medical records, and (2) analyzed the data.220 So, too, with the
researchers who assessed knee pain through MRIs; there, patients who
consented to the study disclosed information to a single group of researchers
who (1) compiled the X-ray data and (2) parsed it to generate a working
model.221 In both of these examples, the collectors were also the processors.
In visual terms, the relationship might be depicted roughly as follows, with
data flowing from individuals to a single entity that plays two roles:
FIGURE 2

Organization

This schematic obscures two points that are essential in the inference
economy, in which data about many people can be collected and processed
to make inferences about others, and there is an increased potential payoff
from engaging in this sort of data analysis. First, it disregards how a
particular ML model can be applied back to human beings. The linear
approach assumes that the individual who cedes control of their data is the
same individual potentially affected by the information collection,
processing, or disclosure. In this schema, privacy is personal. But a datadriven ML inference can also be applied to a third party who never entered
any agreement.222

220
221
222
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See supra Section II.A.
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Second, it fails to underscore that organizations can play distinct roles
as data collectors and information processors. Consider a situation like the
indeterminate case discussed above: health predictions from internet posts,
such as a study that predicts postpartum depression based on social media
disclosures.223 There, the researchers doing the study are the information
processors. The original data collector, though, is the social media platform
that aggregated the data. A similar division exists in many of the more
contentious ML applications. For instance, in a facial recognition instrument,
the processing entity might be the same as the collecting entity, as was the
case in Facebook’s internally created DeepFace model.224 There, the same
pathway as above would still apply. But the entity doing the information
processing also might be an unrelated third party, as is the case with, for
example, facial recognition company Clearview AI. The linear approach
doesn’t capture this relational dynamic, either.225
A better approach is to recognize the more complex individual–
organizational relationships at stake:

223 See Munmun De Choudhury, Scott Counts, Eric J. Horvitz & Aaron Hoff, Characterizing and
Predicting Postpartum Depression from Shared Facebook Data, in ASS’N FOR COMPUTING MACH.,
CSCW’14: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 17TH ACM CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER SUPPORTED COOPERATIVE
WORK & SOCIAL COMPUTING 625, 626 (2014) (using Facebook data to detect and predict postpartum
depression).
224 See supra text accompanying notes 167–168.
225 See Kerr, supra note 119, at 132–34 (suggesting that the relationship between the “data subject”
and the “other” has become murkier). Rather than focus on the uncertainty of this relationship or the
implications for theories of privacy, this Article aims to provide a conceptual framework for thinking
about these complex organizational relationships.
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FIGURE 3

Here, I use the term “data subject” to cover both (1) an individual whose
data is collected, used, or disclosed by an organization or entity and (2) an
individual to whom a data-driven ML inference is subsequently applied to
derive further information.226 I use the terms “data collector” and
“information processor” to underscore how the act of processing transforms
data to information. It is unnecessary to settle where the “data” versus
“information” line falls to denote a phase shift, akin to the change from gas
to liquid.227 Furthermore, by separating “data collector” from “information
processor,” I do not mean to suggest that these actors are always distinct;

226 This definition is broader than the one set forth in the GDPR. Under the GDPR, “‘personal data’
means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’),” and “an
identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly.” Regulation 2016/679, of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), art. 4(1), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 3 [hereinafter
GDPR]. In a pre-GDPR contribution, Hildebrandt argues that profiling entails a “data subject” in a way
that is distinct from conventional data protection legislation. Hildebrandt, supra note 9, at 19. Her account
similarly suggests that a “subject” can be either the entity from which data is collected or the entity to
which an algorithmically generated “profile” is applied. This Article focuses on how these dynamics play
out in the American context, with an emphasis on the incentive structures and power dynamics that ML
generates.
227 See also Hildebrandt, supra note 9, at 17 (positioning data profiling, in general, as a form of
knowledge creation). I reserve further consideration of the regulatory consequences of this phase
transition, including how it places tremendous pressure on the concept of “personally identifiable
information,” for future work. Thank you to Nikolas Guggenberger for his incisive questions and
comments concerning these categories.
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indeed, a company like Google might well occupy both roles. My point is to
label the activities as distinct ones.
Like all models, I recognize that this schema simplifies for the sake of
expositional clarity. For instance, I do not consider here whether any of the
depicted information flows might be bidirectional, and if so, under what
conditions.
This representation is nonetheless useful to specify how both the
relationships between actors and the dataflows can be different in the ML
era.228 As with the linear approach, data flows between subjects and
collectors. It also flows between data collectors and information processors,
who aggregate and develop the data into an ML model that is the means to
derive more information. Then, the information processor may take the ML
working model and apply the prediction to the same person whose data was
initially collected. Or it may apply the prediction to other people whom it
deems sufficiently similar to a given category of individuals. This cluster of
relationships and the power dynamics within it are much more complicated
than the linear model.
Even laws that suggest that it is important to take more than two-party
relationships into account miss this relational dynamic. European data
protection law, for instance, regulates multiple categories of entities that
handle individual data and places affirmative obligations on certain
entities.229 Specifically, the European Union’s General Data Protection

228 See GEORGE E. P. BOX & NORMAN DRAPER, EMPIRICAL MODEL-BUILDING AND RESPONSE
SURFACES 74 (1987) (“Remember that all models are wrong; the practical question is how wrong do they
have to be to not be useful.”).
229 Scholars differ on how much the GDPR’s prescriptions create a systemic accountability regime
that goes beyond endowing data subjects with individual rights or enhancing individual control. For an
argument that the GDPR represents a “binary governance” regime of individual rights and system-wide
accountability mechanisms, see Margot E. Kaminski, Binary Governance: Lessons from the GDPR’s
Approach to Algorithmic Accountability, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1529, 1582–1615 (2019); see also Meg Leta
Jones & Margot E. Kaminski, An American’s Guide to the GDPR, 98 DENV. L. REV. 93, 116–19 (2021)
(“[T]he GDPR consists of two approaches to data protection: a set of individual rights and a set of
company obligations.”), and Margot E. Kaminski & Gianclaudio Malgieri, Algorithmic Impact
Assessments Under the GDPR: Producing Multi-Layered Explanations, 11 INT’L DATA PRIV. L. 125,
126–27 (2020). But see, e.g., Pałka, supra note 108, at 621–22 (characterizing the EU approach as focused
on data protection and individual interests, using “technocratic means of decision-making in place of
political ones”); Hartzog, supra note 43, at 972–73 (characterizing control as “the archetype for data
protection regimes” and consent as “the linchpin” of the GDPR). This Article’s focus is the American
regime, which, as discussed supra Part I, is unabashedly individualistic.
Insofar as data protection in general and the GDPR in particular rely on, at least to some extent,
individual control, and ML both undermines individuals’ capacity to control their data and unravels “their
data” as a coherent category, the pressure that ML puts on American protections extends internationally,
too. This issue exists even if the GDPR can also be understood to promote systemic accountability
measures.
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Regulation (GDPR) identifies “data controllers” and “data processors.”230
Under this framework, a “data controller determines the purposes for which
and the means by which personal data is processed.”231 Then, the data
processor, which may be a third-party entity or may be the same entity as the
data controller, “processes personal data only on behalf of the controller.”232
But this relationship is distinct from the triangular one depicted above. Under
the GDPR, a data processor has an explicit contractual, or otherwise legally
binding, set of specified duties towards a controller.233 The relationship
between controller and processor is defined by law, and there is a general
assumption that the processor is an agent of the controller. And, critically,
there is no recognition of the transformation of data to information.
So, too, under the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (CCPA), a
leading state effort to enact information privacy protections.234 There, the
statute applies to “businesses” that operate for-profit in California and meet
certain size or operational thresholds.235 It requires those businesses to
comply with enumerated consumer-privacy rights.236 The CCPA also
stipulates that businesses that sell or share a consumer’s personal information
with a third party or “service provider or contractor for a business purpose”
must enter into an agreement with that third party, service provider, or
contractor.237 Again, the relationship between controller and processor is
defined by law, and there is an assumption that there is a defined,
preestablished relationship between a business and another party that might
receive or process consumer data. The hitch is that this understanding doesn’t
account for instances in which there is not such a clear relationship between
entities that hold data (data collectors) and entities that develop data into ML
models (information processors). Nor does it consider that what is collected
may be transformed by the act of processing.
To see the distinct relational dynamics at stake today, consider
PimEyes, a publicly accessible website. It bills itself as an “online face
search engine” that uses ML technology to allow any individual to “track

230

See GDPR, supra note 226, art. 4(7)–(8).
What Is a Data Controller or a Data Processor?, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/
law-topic/data-protection/reform/rules-business-and-organisations/obligations/controller-processor/
what-data-controller-or-data-processor_en [https://perma.cc/XUK8-GB6P] (emphasis omitted).
232
Id. (emphasis omitted).
233 Id.
234 See supra text accompanying notes 69–72 (discussing CCPA) and note 69 (discussing subsequent
referendum that clarified consumer rights under the statute and created a state privacy protection agency).
235 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(d).
236 Id. §§ 1798.100–.125; California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), STATE CAL. DEP’T JUST.,
https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa [https://perma.cc/9NTT-JS2K].
237 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100(d).
231
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down [their] face on the Internet, reclaim image rights, and monitor [their]
online presence.”238 Individuals are meant to search only for their own image,
but there is no binding restriction on who can upload photos to the site or
who can receive results.239 According to media coverage, if provided with a
picture of a given individual, PimEyes can scan over 900 million images
from across the internet in under one second and find images that match that
person.240 It operates by “crawl[ing]” the web with “bots,” “scanning for
photos of faces and then recording those images as numerical code.”241 The
code is then matched to new images that it scans and receives. In short, this
mode of operation works by using ML to take data (photos) and then parsing
them against other information (compilations of photos that it has processed
into numerical codes) to make inferences about identity.
Tabling specific critiques of PimEyes and the modes of surveillance it
facilitates, a close look at the PimEyes model reveals lessons about the
broader information privacy ecosystem in the United States. It’s possible to
understand PimEyes as a “data controller” that also acts as a “data processor”
(in GDPR terms) or a “business” (in CCPA terms). But rushing to this
conclusion obscures as much as it clarifies. The PimEyes approach relies on
the compilations of other data collectors—the masses of data from Google,
public sources, and social media sites—to carry out processing.242 Moreover,
there is no relationship—contractual, legal, or implied—between PimEyes
and these other entities. Nor are the individuals who agreed to disclose data
to these other entities necessarily even aware of PimEyes. In fact, some of
those individuals may have done no more than move about in public. And

238 Face Search Engine Reverse Image Search, PIMEYES, https://pimeyes.com/en [https://perma.cc/
XQW6-PEXJ].
239 See
More
About
PimEyes’
Database
and
Opt-Out
Service,
PIMEYES,
https://pimeyes.com/en/blog/more-about-pimeyes-database-and-opt-out-service [https://perma.cc/L94SSDQ3]; see also Metz, supra note 25 (expressing alarm that “PimEyes is open to anyone with internet
access”).
240 Drew Harwell, This Facial Recognition Website Can Turn Anyone into a Cop — or a Stalker,
WASH. POST (May 14, 2021, 7:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/05/14/
pimeyes-facial-recognition-search-secrecy [https://perma.cc/MBJ2-Q47P].
241 Id.
242 Although the company states that its results come only from publicly accessible sources,
researchers have located results that appear to come from social media sites like Instagram, Twitter,
YouTube, and TikTok. Compare Image Search with PimEyes, How to Reverse Image Search, PIMEYES,
https://pimeyes.com/en/blog/image-search-with-pimeyes [https://perma.cc/Y2TL-C997] (stating that
PimEyes’ search results “come from publicly available websites like the news, media, blogs, company
websites, etc.” and not from “social media or video platforms, including public profiles (e.g. of
companies, influencers, brands)”), with Harwell, supra note 240 (reporting that “photos from [social
media] are regularly among the [PimEyes] results” and there is evidence of search “results from
Instagram, YouTube, Twitter and TikTok”).
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PimEyes is not the only entity that trades on data in the inference economy
in this fashion.
Information privacy regulation as we know it misses these relational
dynamics. The current regulatory vocabulary does not identify the distinct
position that information processors occupy. It thus fails to recognize the
distinct power that they can exercise, whether by leveraging data that they
themselves collect or by accessing data collected by other entities. This
omission is a problem because processing power matters in data analytics in
general, and for ML in particular. The activities of information processors,
who ingest data from data collectors, can threaten information privacy
interests at least as acutely as other entities. And data collectors who are also
information processors occupy a particularly powerful inferential position.
More clearly labeling the categories “data collector” and “information
processor” opens different avenues for reform, targeted at particular legs of
the triangle, and helps to more clearly pinpoint which power dynamic a given
intervention might address as well as how to do so without foreclosing data
analysis that might be socially beneficial.243
A triangular framework provides the strategic framework that is
missing from leading reform proposals. The remainder of this Section
considers interventions at each of the legs of the triangle, highlighting how
this reframing casts light on the relationships and dependencies among
particular sets of actors, fosters a more nuanced understanding of regulatory
objectives, and creates opportunities for novel regulatory interventions to
promote information privacy protection at the level of the system, and not
merely the level of the individual.244
Unless otherwise indicated, for ease of exposition, I use the terms “collectors” and “data
collectors” and “processors” and “information processors” synonymously in the remainder of this
Section. So, too, does the abbreviated word “subject” refer to both senses of the term “data subject.” See
supra text accompanying note 226.
244 In making these suggestions, I do not advocate an Americanized version of the GDPR. I do think
that the U.S. protective regime is missing systemic accountability mechanisms, which some scholars
believe the GDPR generates. See supra note 229. However, particularly in the American context, where
the conditions for GDPR-style “collaborative governance” do not exist, such an approach is misguided.
See Chander et al., supra note 3, at 1761–62 (documenting distinct “legal setting[s]” for the GDPR and
CCPA); Hartzog & Richards, supra note 53, at 1692 (noting “trans-Atlantic differences in rights, cultures,
commitments, and regulatory appetites”); cf. Solow-Niederman, supra note 144, at 633 (contending that
contemporary imbalance of public and private resources, expertise, and power in the United States makes
collaborative governance infeasible for AI). I worry, moreover, that a data protection regime will overlook
the nature of the relationship among information processors and data collectors and fail to pinpoint
relational dependencies that are auspicious intervention points. The present account thus operates one
level up and aims to reframe the nature of the relationships at issue in order to clarify the power dynamics
and incentives that are salient for subjects, collectors, and processors; catalyze discussion concerning the
socially desirable level of data processing in light of those relational dynamics; and, in turn, craft
interventions that reflect that determination in a way that is responsive to the American political and legal
context. Thank you to Hannah Bloch-Wehba for helpful conversations on this point.
243
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1. Data Subjects and Data Collectors
The subject–collector relationship is most familiar to information
privacy law. It seems to fit neatly within the linear approach: data flows
between the source of the data (subject) and the entity that aggregates it
(collector). Yet concluding that the linear approach amply addresses this
relationship is too simplistic. This conclusion does not recognize the ways in
which ML exposes and exacerbates latent flaws in the linear, controlcentered paradigm. A better strategy is to situate subjects and collectors as
one leg of a triangle, with an emphasis on the relationships between the
entities, and not the dataflow itself. Doing so highlights the inferential power
that collectors may amass relative to subjects.
This framing builds from an emerging scholarly consensus that
information privacy is fundamentally and irreducibly relational. An
increasing number of privacy scholars focus on privacy as trust, emphasizing
the “informational relationships” that define the contemporary era.245
Complementary work envisions data collectors as entities that, by virtue of
how they are granted access to our information, owe particular relational
duties to us.246
Recognizing that data collectors may or may not be the same entities as
information processors allows better tailoring of “information fiduciary”
duties and ancillary duties such as a duty of loyalty.247 These proposals tend
to emphasize the relationship between a user and the entity that initially
acquires the information as part of a commercial transaction. For instance,
in advocating a duty of loyalty for privacy law, Richards and Hartzog argue
that dominant regulatory approaches “have overlooked how companies who
interact with people in online environments exploit their structural and
informational superiority over the people trusting them with their data and
245 See, e.g., Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Privacy’s Trust Gap: A Review, 126 YALE L.J.
1180, 1185 (2017) (reviewing FINN BRUNTON & HELEN NISSENBAUM, OBFUSCATION: A USER’S GUIDE
FOR PRIVACY AND PROTEST (2015)). For a small sampling of a large body of work that conceptualizes
privacy as trust, see generally WALDMAN, supra note 7, and Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking
Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431, 431 (2016).
246 See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 203, at 1185–86 (discussing how “people and organizations who
collect and use [personal] data” grow increasingly powerful and should “have special duties to act in ways
that do not harm the interests of the people whose information they collect, analyze, use, sell, and
distribute”); Jack M. Balkin & Jonathan Zittrain, A Grand Bargain to Make Tech Companies Trustworthy,
ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/10/informationfiduciary/502346 [https://perma.cc/4ET3-F76R] (arguing that these data collectors should “have legal
obligations to be trustworthy” (emphasis omitted)); see also Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, A Duty
of Loyalty for Privacy Law, 99 WASH. U. L. REV. 961, 966–67 (2021) (developing a duty of loyalty as “a
basic element of U.S. data privacy law”).
247 Richards & Hartzog, supra note 246, at 995–96 (explaining that the duty of loyalty is usually
seen as a primary fiduciary duty and proposing that it could “act as an interpretive guide for other rules
and duties”).
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online experiences.”248 Richards and Hartzog therefore propose that data
collectors should owe a duty of loyalty under certain relationally defined
conditions,249 one of which is when “people are made vulnerable” by “their
exposure,” including through “[t]he collection and processing of personal
data.”250
So, too, is the information fiduciary model centrally concerned with a
similar kind of relationship between a company and its users. This model,
first articulated by Jack Balkin and later developed along with Jonathan
Zittrain, proposes “special duties with respect to personal information that
[entities] obtain in the course of their relationships with their [users].”251 In a
world where data and information are synonymous, regulating collectors
suffices to protect users who provide data. Moreover, in a world where a
collector is also a processor who uses data to generate information, it might
well make sense to target the collector as a means to impose corollary duties
on the processor. For instance, under a strong form of the information
fiduciary model, the collector must ensure that “privacy protections run with
the data,”252 whether subsequent processing occurs inside or outside of the
collecting organization.253
For data privacy as a whole, more explicitly recognizing the functional
roles that data collectors and information processors occupy, and their
relationship to one another, permits more precise calibration of the nature
and scope of any fiduciary duties owed to subjects. Collectors who are also
processors and who have a formal relationship with subjects occupy a

248

Id. at 978.
Id. at 994 (“We believe that in most circumstances, a duty of loyalty should mean that data
collectors are obligated to pursue the ‘best interests’ of the trusting party with respect to what is exposed
and entrusted.”); id. at 1004 (identifying threshold conditions for the duty of loyalty to apply: “(1) when
trust is invited, (2) from people made vulnerable by exposure, (3) when the trustee has control over
people’s online experiences and data processing, and (4) when people trust data collectors with their
exposure”). Earlier work on fiduciary law also focuses on data collectors. See, e.g., Ian Kerr, Personal
Relationships in the Year 2000: Me and My ISP, in PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS OF DEPENDENCE AND
INTERDEPENDENCE IN LAW 78, 84–85 (2002) (discussing how Internet service providers collect data on
users and identifying the relationship as one of “dependence”).
250 Richards & Hartzog, supra note 246, at 1006.
251 Balkin, supra note 203, at 1208; see Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries in the Digital Age,
BALKANIZATION (Mar. 5, 2014, 4:50 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/03/information-fiduciariesin-digital-age.html [https://perma.cc/P7LT-QVWB]; see also Balkin & Zittrain, supra note 246
(advocating for a new kind of law that “clearly states the kinds of duties that online firms owe their end
users and customers,” including “a duty to look out for the interests of the people whose data businesses
regularly harvest and profit from”).
252 Balkin, supra note 203, at 1220.
253 In prior work, I’ve argued that it makes sense to think of data security in this way, wherein those
who obtain data under conditions of trust are held responsible if their choices enable data breaches that
violate that trust. Solow-Niederman, supra note 56, at 625–26.
249
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particular position of inferential power relative to subjects. Most digitalplatform firms, such as Facebook or Google, fall into this category. That’s
why it may be most appropriate to impose the full information fiduciary
framework on such data collectors.254
This recognition, moreover, underscores how and why different
approaches are required to regulate collectors who are also processors, as
compared to other processors. For joint collector-processors, interventions
such as bans of a particular kind of ML instrument establish that a collector
may not process data in a particular way, on the grounds that doing so
inappropriately leverages the firm’s position in the inference economy. But
processors that are not directly related either to the collector or to the
subject—picture an outside firm that gleans “emergent medical data” about
mood disorders from the colors in Instagram posts255—may require a
complementary regulatory approach targeted at that leg of the triangle.
Labeling this subset of processors as “collectors” obscures how such
processors take advantage of the affordances of other collectors and too
easily allows those other collectors to evade responsibility for the broad
reach of their choices.256 A triangular framing of the interests at stake
facilitates a more informed policy conversation by highlighting where a
trust-based approach may work best, indicating where policymakers or
courts may need to be more precise with the terms that they use to refer to
the data collector (or information processor) at issue, and suggesting where
other interventions to regulate processing activities directly may be required.
2. Data Collectors and Information Processors
The collector–processor relationship represents an underexplored
avenue for intervention. The linear approach assumes a direct relationship
between collectors and processors. As we have seen, however, that direct
relationship is not always present. Processors can draw inferences from
compilations of information that are made available by data collectors,
whether or not they have any formal relationship to those collectors. And
ML opens up precisely these inferential pathways.
A trilateral relational frame highlights how collectors’ choices make
data more or less available, and how these choices in turn affect what
activities processors may execute. Put differently, collectors’ decisions
determine how easy or hard it is to compile information. This compilation
254 Cf. Richards & Hartzog, supra note 53, at 1746 (noting “stringent duties” of the information
fiduciary model and calling for a complementary set of “trust rules” that “are not necessarily dependent
upon formal relationships to function”).
255 See Birnbaum et al., supra note 213, at 1; see also supra note 106 and accompanying text
(discussing “emergent medical data”).
256 See infra Section IV.B.2.
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matters. Privacy scholars have long warned of the harms that can be
unleashed in a world where there are masses of compiled data about
individuals.257 Indeed, this concern with data aggregation and the profits to
be reaped from it animates surveillance capitalist critiques;258 moreover, the
1973 HEW report on privacy was motivated by a concern with the
emergence of centralized, computerized databases.259
What is new is how processors can now centralize data by compiling
aggregated bodies of data that other collectors fail to amply protect and then
use this data to derive further information. For instance, although social
media posts that mention a sensitive medical condition are not centrally
collected by the social media platform, these posts can be understood as
distributed data points that are ripe for processing by external actors. How
hard or easy a collector makes it to harvest these data points, and with what
consequences, affects a processor’s access to data in ways that, in turn, limit
or expand the kinds of activities that the processor can undertake.
To make this point more concrete, take the example of face datasets and
the generation of commercial facial recognition tools. A company like
Clearview AI relied on Facebook and other images collected by platforms to
generate its database.260 In the face of mounting public opposition to facial
recognition databases, including several mainstream-media exposés,
Facebook went on the record to chastise Clearview AI.261 Other companies
such as Twitter, YouTube, and Venmo have also publicly stated that
Clearview’s scraping practices violate their terms of service.262 These firms
seem to have limited their responses to cease-and-desist letters and public
denunciations, after the scraping was already done (and only in the wake of
mounting public controversy about facial recognition technologies).

257 See Ohm, supra note 52, at 1746 (describing “database[s] of ruin,” or the potential for “the
worldwide collection of all of the facts held by third parties that can be used to cause privacy-related harm
to almost every member of society”); Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of
Public and Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 244 (2007) (arguing
that computer databases containing personal, identifying information should be understood as
“reservoirs” that endanger the public if they leak).
258 See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar & Aziz Z. Huq, Economies of Surveillance, 133 HARV. L. REV.
1280, 1295–97 (2020) (reviewing ZUBOFF, supra note 16).
259 ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERS. DATA SYS. , supra note 47, v–vi.
260 See Hill, supra note 4.
261 See Steven Melendez, Facebook Orders Creepy AI Firm to Stop Scraping Your Instagram Photos,
FAST CO. (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.fastcompany.com/90461077/facebook-joins-fellow-techcompanies-in-publicly-opposing-a-controversial-face-recognition-firm [https://perma.cc/7Pj9-AMM6].
262 Facebook, Twitter, Youtube, Venmo Demand AI Startup Must Stop Scraping Faces from Sites,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 5, 2020, 10:16 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/facebook-twitteryoutube-venmo-demand-ai-startup-must-stop-scraping-faces-from-sites-2020-02-05 [https://perma.cc/
K4NL-XDBE].
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These companies could have done more, and sooner. For instance, on
the technological side, such firms could have implemented an automated flag
whenever an entity scraped a suspiciously large quantity of data from the
site, creating an early warning system before an entity like Clearview
processed the data. And on the legal side, these firms could have stepped up
enforcement of their terms of service with litigation. The choice neither to
implement technical measures nor to advocate on behalf of their users’
interests in the court of public opinion or in actual court was an active
decision by collectors.263 And that decision facilitated processing by parties
with no relationship to the collectors’ users.264 A triangular framing
263 That’s not to say that lawsuits would have been a slam dunk, particularly if brought under the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA). Some of these scraping activities occurred in the shadow of a
2019 CFAA case, hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., which involved a dispute between LinkedIn and a
rival corporate-analytics company that had scraped information posted on public-facing portions of
LinkedIn profiles. 938 F.3d 985, 989–92 (9th Cir. 2019). The Ninth Circuit found “serious questions
about whether LinkedIn may invoke the CFAA to preempt hiQ’s possibly meritorious [state law] tortious
interference claim.” Id. at 1004. In June 2021, the Supreme Court granted LinkedIn’s petition for a writ
of certiorari, vacated the Ninth Circuit’s judgment, and remanded the case “for further consideration in
light of” the Court’s disposition of a different CFAA suit, Van Buren v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1648
(2021), which narrowed the statute’s reach. See LinkedIn Corp. v. hiQ Labs, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 2752 (2021);
Orin S. Kerr, Focusing the CFAA in Van Buren, 2021 SUP. CT. REV. 155, 164–65, 173–80 (explaining
how Van Buren “partially focuses” the CFAA picture); Orin Kerr, The Supreme Court Reins in the CFAA
in Van Buren, LAWFARE (June 9, 2021, 9:04 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/supreme-court-reinscfaa-van-buren [https://perma.cc/5ND9-2W7L].
In April 2022, hearing the case on remand, the Ninth Circuit arrived at the same conclusion that it
had reached previously and affirmed the district court’s initial disposition granting hiQ’s motion for a
preliminary injunction, finding that public profiles do not require authorization or access permission and
thus are not subject to the access limitations set forth in the CFAA. hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp.,
31 F.4th 1180, 1202 (9th Cir. 2022) (on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court). The Ninth Circuit
distinguished between the publicly available information at issue in hiQ Labs and situations in which a
website “‘has tried to limit and control access to its website’ as to the purposes for which . . . [an outside
entity] sought to use it.” Id. at 1199 (quoting Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1067
(9th Cir. 2016)). It also left open, without deciding, the possibility that “web scraping exceeding the scope
of the website owner’s consent gives rise to a common law tort claim for trespass to chattels, at least
when it causes demonstrable harm.” Id. at 1202 n.21.
264 See Jonathan Zittrain & John Bowers, A Start-Up Is Using Photos to ID You. Big Tech
Can Stop It from Happening Again., WASH. POST (Apr. 14, 2020, 3:58 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/04/14/tech-start-up-is-using-photos-id-you-big-techcould-have-stopped-them [https://perma.cc/439Y-JBCQ] (suggesting “platforms must shoulder some of
the blame” for Clearview AI’s development). I do not mean to suggest that enforcement under a statute
like the CFAA is necessarily a good idea, at least without substantial clarification of the statute. For
instance, it seems important, as a policy matter, to distinguish between access for research and access for
commercial purposes. See SUNOO PARK & KENDRA ALBERT, HARV. L. SCH. CYBERLAW CLINIC & ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND., A RESEARCHER’S GUIDE TO SOME LEGAL RISKS OF SECURITY RESEARCH 8 (2020).
It is essential to think carefully about how to draw the right lines between access to publicly accessible
information and access to information that the user of a platform service believes is private. For an
argument that the use of cyber-trespass laws like the CFAA to bar access to publicly available information
amounts to a First Amendment violation, see Thomas E. Kadri, Platforms as Blackacres, 68 UCLA L.
REV. 1184, 1190–93 (2022).
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underscores not only this facilitation, but also processors’ dependency on
collectors.
Furthermore, a triangular approach reveals how the regulatory status
quo, coupled with the business model of platform firms, incentivize
arrangements that align collectors and processors against subjects’ interests.
For example, media reports allege that Clearview scraped profile images
from the payment platform Venmo.265 Venmo exposed any profile photos
that a user has ever uploaded, simply by manually changing the image URL,
and did not provide any direct way for Venmo users to delete or even to
review these images.266 The work of the processor (Clearview) is possible in
no small part because of the choices of the collector (Venmo). At present,
the informational power that flows from that relationship is essentially
unchecked, apart from companies’ own choices.
Excavating these relational dependencies reveals intervention points
that emphasize the collector–processor leg of the triangle. For instance, on
the regulatory side, the FTC could undertake a set of strategic enforcement
activities against firms that do not enforce their own terms of service against
third-party violators.267 Alternatively, or in addition, a body within the FTC,
such as the new rulemaking group proposed by former Acting FTC Chair
Rebecca Slaughter, could issue a statement concerning this third-party
evasion of firms’ terms of service, thereby providing a roadmap for
collectors to follow.268 These rules would need to provide more than thin
procedural guidance and would need to avoid conflating consumer consent
with meaningful control over actual information flows. They would need to
specify the minimum standard that platforms that collect data must follow
when enforcing their own terms of service, thereby creating a floor below
265 See Hill, supra note 4; Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Venmo Demand AI Startup Must Stop
Scraping Faces from Sites, supra note 262; Louise Matsakis, Scraping the Web Is a Powerful Tool.
Clearview AI Abused It, WIRED (Jan. 25, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/clearview-aiscraping-web [https://perma.cc/6T5D-W655]; Ryan Mac, Caroline Haskins & Logan McDonald,
Clearview AI Has Promised to Cancel All Relationships with Private Companies, BUZZFEED NEWS (May
7, 2020, 5:50 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/clearview-ai-no-facial-recognitionprivate-companies [https://perma.cc/WWE4-VSDT].
266 See Katie Notopoulos, Venmo Exposes All the Old Profile Photos You Thought Were Gone,
BUZZFEED NEWS (May 18, 2021, 8:29 AM) https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/katienotopoulos/
paypals-venmo-exposes-old-photos?mc_cid=da82a8d945&mc_eid=0cfb8ad92b
[https://perma.cc/
7JUZ-P8SN].
267 There is administrative law precedent for this move. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 56, at 663
(citing FTC v. Accusearch Inc., No. 06-CV-0105 (D. Wyo. Sept. 28, 2007)) (discussing a 2007 FTC
enforcement action in which the Commission asserted that one company engaged in unfair practices by
facilitating another company’s violation of the Telecommunications Act).
268 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Acting Chairwoman Slaughter Announces New
Rulemaking Group (Mar. 25, 2021), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2021/03/ftc-actingchairwoman-slaughter-announces-new-rulemaking-group [https://perma.cc/PS8G-6VEP].
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which acceptable business practices should not fall. Guidance of this sort
would not only help users, but also provide a more predictable environment
for firms by clarifying what is expected of them with respect to external
processors.
Such administrative guidance might be most effective if paired with
technical solutions to help regulated collectors comply with any such formal
guidance. Technical interventions might automatically identify widespread
scraping of a website. Specifically, because so-called “bots” that scrape
websites tend to operate at far faster speeds than human users, websites
might monitor the speed of interactions with the site to create a signal that
scraping is likely occurring.269 The FTC or other regulatory bodies might then
explicitly incorporate technical interventions of this sort into published
guidance on “Privacy by Design”;270 over time, these standards could become
part of the expected set of standard privacy practices for firms that trade in
data. In addition, as the next Section addresses, a more explicit focus on the
subject–processor dynamic facilitates a more textured understanding of
subjects’ interests relative to each of these parties.
3. Data Subjects and Information Processors
A triangular frame directs attention to subject–processor relationships
that the linear model tends to obscure. Processing is relevant within
traditional frames—but primarily in terms of dataflows. For example, data
protection regulations can and do consider use restrictions,271 and the FTC’s
unfair and deceptive trade practices analysis may take into account whether
individuals agreed to the full suite of processing activities at the time they
consented to terms of service.272
Homing in on the subject–processor leg of the triangle forces greater
specificity about why a particular information-processing activity, as applied
to data subjects, warrants attention. Two categories of issues stand out. One
concerns the processor: what kinds of processors are positioned to leverage
data in the inference economy, subject to what constraints? The other

269

See What Is Data Scraping?, CLOUDFLARE, https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/bots/what-isdata-scraping [https://perma.cc/S5V3-2FJF].
270 In 2012, the FTC adopted privacy by design as a baseline principle in its privacy-framework
report. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESS AND POLICYMAKERS 22–32 (2012).
271 The GDPR, for instance, includes “purpose limitation[s]” on even lawfully collected data, and
the proposed implementing regulations for the CCPA, which were not included in the final text, stipulated
that a business “shall not use a consumer’s personal information for a purpose materially different than
those disclosed in the notice at collection.” See Chander et al., supra note 3, at 1756–57 (quoting CAL.
CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 999.305(a)(5) (withdrawn July 29, 2020)).
272 See supra notes 86–91 and accompanying text (discussing the EverAlbum settlement).
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concerns the subject: what is the felt impact of a processing decision at the
point of application by an ML instrument?
Take, first, the processor. Because what a processor can do turns on
both formal law and how technological and economic configurations
constrain or enable particular activities, it would be incorrect to suggest that
any old processor can vacuum up publicly available data and efficiently
convert it into a working algorithm. To the contrary, the current state of ML
generally requires vast amounts of data and compute to operate effectively.273
Thus, the areas in which widespread ML analytics are possible will depend
at least in part on access to these resources.
Two processor-related insights follow. One, because access to adequate
compute tends to be concentrated in a comparatively small set of firms rather
than democratized, mergers and acquisitions have profound implications for
data privacy. Indeed, contemporary privacy regulators might do well to take
a page from competition law and consider how the accumulation of hardware
and data capital can erode structural protections of privacy by facilitating a
wider range of processing activities.274 As a case in point, when the FTC
approved Google’s acquisition of the online ad-serving company
DoubleClick, it provided Google with a vast new reservoir of data to
process—despite the objections of privacy advocates who were concerned
that the merger was not in the public interest for this very reason.275 Future
policymakers should pay close attention to similar privacy risks not only for
data acquisition, but also for further concentrations of compute power.
Two, the available range of processing activities is contingent on the
technological state of the art. Further changes in compute power, such as a
major breakthrough in quantum computing, could significantly alter the
political economy of information privacy.276 So, too, could rapid progress on
ML models that permit efficient training with less data,277 or the realization
273

See supra Section II.B.
In a future project, (De)Platforming Artificial Intelligence, I intend to address the political
economy of AI development in more detail.
275 See Dawn Kawamoto, FTC Allows Google-DoubleClick Merger to Proceed, CNET (Mar.
21, 2008, 1:52 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/ftc-allows-google-doubleclick-merger-to-proceed-1
[https://perma.cc/43Y6-LDC6].
276 See Lohr, supra note 159 (discussing how the need for compute power leads to centralization in
AI). For further analysis of how computational power shapes AI development paths, see Tim Hwang,
Computational Power and the Social Impact of Artificial Intelligence (Mar. 23, 2018) (unpublished
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/a=3147971 [https://perma.cc/ZY3V-7ZWX].
277 These methods are alluring given their transformative potential yet remain largely theoretical. See
Karen Hao, A Radical New Technique Lets AI Learn with Practically No Data, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct.
16, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/10/16/1010566/ai-machine-learning-with-tiny-data
[https://perma.cc/964C-JQ3W] (discussing efforts to create “less than one shot” learning capable of
274
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of a National Research Cloud that increases the supply of data to trusted
actors.278 Focusing on processors as distinct entities brings these
considerations into the frame of information privacy regulation.
Furthermore, an emphasis on the subject–processor relationship directs
attention to the people affected by a particular data-driven model. For
instance, in thinking about information processing, there is a meaningful
distinction between a tool that has a discriminatory effect on individuals,
even if it is developed and trained with representative data, and a tool that
has the potential for discriminatory impacts if it is trained on a nondiverse
dataset or otherwise does not follow best practices in its development. The
first example—a processing activity that has a high risk of biased
informational outputs, no matter what—presents the strongest justification
for a ban. Emotion-recognition technologies, which inevitably require blunt
racial and cultural judgments about how individuals’ faces look when they
present certain emotions, might fall into this category.279 Any woman who
has been accused of having “resting bitch face” when she is merely thinking
knows the problem all too well.280 In such situations, bright-line rules may
be most appropriate.

“recogniz[ing] more objects than the number of examples it was trained on”); Natalie Ram, One Shot
Learning in AI Innovation, AI PULSE (Jan. 25, 2019), https://aipulse.org/one-shot-learning-in-aiinnovation/?pdf=142 [https://perma.cc/ALP5-252E] (discussing developing efforts to create one-shot
learning models that can be trained with less data).
278 See John Etchemendy & Fei-Fei Li, National Research Cloud: Ensuring the Continuation of
American Innovation, STAN. UNIV. HUM.-CENTERED A.I. (Mar. 28, 2020), https://hai.stanford.edu/
news/national-research-cloud-ensuring-continuation-american-innovation
[https://perma.cc/DJV9SS6P] (advocating for a National Research Cloud to provide data and compute for academic researchers).
The National Artificial Intelligence Initiative Act of 2020 directs the National Science Foundation
Director and the Office of Science and Technology Policy to “investigate the feasibility and advisability
of establishing and sustaining a National Artificial Intelligence Research Resource,” which would include
shared compute power and access to government datasets. See National Artificial Intelligence Initiative
Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-283, § 5106, 134 Stat. 4523, 4531–34 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 9415), https://www.congress.gov/116/plaws/publ283/PLAW-116publ283.pdf [https://perma.cc/V9EZLDMW].
279 See, e.g., Luke Stark, The Emotive Politics of Digital Mood Tracking, 22 NEW MEDIA &
SOC’Y 2039, 2040–41 (2020), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1461444820924624
[https://perma.cc/BK8W-KF4C] (assessing the impact of cultural influences in the context of digital
mood-tracking applications Moodscope and MoodPanda); see also Mark Purdy, John Zealley & Omaro
Maseli, The Risks of Using AI to Interpret Human Emotions, HARV. BUS. REV. (2019),
https://hbr.org/2019/11/the-risks-of-using-ai-to-interpret-human-emotions
[https://perma.cc/M77EUUGT] (considering the risks of bias in emotional AI technology and noting how “one study found that
emotional analysis technology assigns more negative emotions to people of certain ethnicities than
to others”).
280 See Jessica Bennett, I’m Not Mad. That’s Just My RBF., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/02/fashion/im-not-mad-thats-just-my-resting-b-face.html
[https://perma.cc/T3AL-J673].
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The second example—a processing activity that is problematic because
of flawed implementation—might call for standards that guide development
choices and thereby regulate how a processor can affect subjects. Congress
would not need to legislate to generate such standards; there are several
regulatory avenues available. For one, the FTC could consider providing
more substantive guidance concerning what it means for a dataset to be
adequately diverse through rulemaking, notwithstanding the procedural
burdens to which it is subject.281
Alternatively, or additionally, agencies responsible for regulating
processing in especially sensitive domains could revisit the specificity of the
regulatory guidance that they provide. As one example, consider lending
laws. The FTC has emphasized that “[t]he lending laws encourage the use of
AI tools that are ‘empirically derived, demonstrably and statistically
sound.’”282 This informal guidance references Regulation B, promulgated by
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). Regulation B provides
that a tool that is “demonstrably and statistically sound” must be
“[d]eveloped and validated using accepted statistical principles and
methodology.”283 But this procedural guidance only goes so far when it
comes to AI-powered tools. Fairness in ML is hotly contested.284 There
are no “accepted statistical principles and methodology” in many ML
contexts; rather, the very choice of a mathematical definition of “fairness” is
a political one.285
281 The FTC lacks general rulemaking authority under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) or
specific authority to issue information privacy rules. See COHEN, supra note 17, at 188 (discussing the
“FTC’s practice of lawmaking through adjudication”). The contemporary Commission instead has
Magnuson-Moss (Mag-Moss) rulemaking authority. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 45–46, 49–52, 56–57c, 2301–2312 (2012)). Mag-Moss rulemaking is more procedurally
burdensome than APA informal rulemaking procedures. Rebecca Kelly Slaughter, Comm’r, Fed. Trade
Comm’n, Remarks at New York University School of Law Cybersecurity and Data Privacy Conference
Program on Corporate Compliance and Enforcement: FTC Data Privacy Enforcement: A Time of
Change 5–6 (Oct. 16, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1581786/
slaughter_-_remarks_on_ftc_data_privacy_enforcement_-_a_time_of_change.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
F2X4-NCAS]. As Julie Cohen notes, because of the limits of its regulatory authority, “the FTC’s
enforcement posture reflects an especially complex calculus.” COHEN, supra note 17, at 188.
282 Andrew Smith, Using Artificial Intelligence and Algorithms, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Apr.
8, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2020/04/using-artificial-intelligencealgorithms [https://perma.cc/8HTS-F3EC] (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 1002.2 (2018) (Regulation B)).
283 12 C.F.R. § 1002.2(p) (2018) (Regulation B).
284 See Deirdre K. Mulligan, Joshua A. Kroll, Nitin Kohli & Richmond Y. Wong, This Thing Called
Fairness: Disciplinary Confusion Realizing a Value in Technology, PROC. ACM ON HUM.-COMPUT.
INTERACTION, Nov. 2019, at 1, 4–5, 16, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1909.11869.pdf [https://perma.cc/SM8BSTB7].
285 See Arvind Narayanan, Tutorial: 21 Fairness Definitions and Their Politics, YOUTUBE (Mar. 1,
2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jIXIuYdnyyk [https://perma.cc/Z3XX-N8QM].
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Attention to the subject–processor leg of the triangle underscores the
human beings affected by the act of information processing and foregrounds
why process alone cannot answer the substantive question of what is “unfair”
here.286 Technical and social understandings of fairness are not necessarily
aligned,287 and seemingly technical choices such as where to set a threshold
in an ML training model can result in outcomes that satisfy a given measure
of fairness for some populations but not for others.288 Furthermore, decisions
such as the level of false-positive or false-negative error rate to tolerate are
themselves normatively laden.289 Accordingly, an agency like the CFPB may
need to revisit language such as Regulation B to recognize the fact that there
may be no settled statistical consensus around, for instance, an acceptable
error rate in a tool, or whether false positives or false negatives are more
problematic in a given context. That’s not to say that the government would
be more accurate, however accuracy is measured, than a private firm with a
profit motive to be accurate; rather, it’s to argue that, in instances that present
a high risk of invidiously discriminatory impact, some form of public
standard-setting is wise.
To that end, the Commerce Department’s National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) represents an untapped source of
guidance. Specifically, the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) grants NIST the authority to “support the development of technical
standards and guidelines” to “promote trustworthy artificial intelligence
systems” and “test for bias.”290 NIST is further tasked with developing “a
voluntary risk management framework” for AI systems, including
“standards, guidelines, best practices, methodologies, procedures and
processes” for “trustworthy” systems as well as “common definitions and
286 See COHEN, supra note 17, at 179–80 (discussing CFPB Regulation B and highlighting how it
“leaves unexplained what . . . [the referenced] principles and methods might be and how they ought to
translate into contexts involving automated, predictive algorithms with artificial intelligence or machine
learning components”).
287 Mulligan et al., supra note 284, at 5–6.
288 See Alicia Solow-Niederman, YooJung Choi & Guy Van den Broeck, The Institutional Life of
Algorithmic Risk Assessment, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 705, 734–39 (2019); see also Rohit Chopra,
Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at Asia Pacific Privacy Authorities 54th APPA Forum 2–3
(Dec. 7, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1585034/chopra-asiapacific.pdf [https://perma.cc/UUN5-CEMP].
289 This issue is by no means academic; to the contrary, recent controversies concerning the use of
automated risk-assessment tools have centered on competing understandings of whether a tool can be
considered fair when it has different false-positive and false-negative error rates for different demographic
groups. See, e.g., Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu & Lauren Kirchner, Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA
(May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminalsentencing [https://perma.cc/F3XJ-DQ98].
290 William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, Pub. L.
No. 116-283, § 5301 (2021).
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characterizations for aspects of trustworthiness, including explainability,
transparency, safety, privacy, security, robustness, fairness, bias, ethics,
validation, verification, interpretability, and other properties related to
artificial intelligence systems that are common across all sectors.”291 Whether
or not NIST can achieve this ambitious target will likely depend in part on
how much the agency hews to a strictly “technical” as opposed to a more
socially-informed understanding of standard-setting.292 And voluntary
standards are no panacea, particularly given the outsized private influence in
the ML industry.293
By delineating the minimum technical rules of the road, such standards
can nonetheless usefully set floors for acceptable information processing.
These floors can in turn provide regulatory hooks for agencies that monitor
the limits of processing and suggest common law standards for courts that
encounter any tort or contract law claims about ML processing.294 The
subject–processor framing draws attention to the manner in which these
kinds of technical standards can affect ML’s development path, thereby
regulating how ML models affect people on the ground.
*

*

*

The inference economy is a reality. We cannot account for it if we are
insufficiently attentive to the ways in which informational power is
distributed among data subjects, data collectors, and information processors.
These dynamics are meaningfully distinct from those assumed in
conventional privacy regulations. Triangulating information privacy as the
result of these relationships both provides a strategic framework that is better
calibrated for institutional power dynamics and opens pathways to more
effective tactical interventions.

291 Id.; see also Summary of AI Provisions from the National Defense Authorization Act 2021,
STAN. UNIV. INST. HUM.-CENTERED A.I., https://hai.stanford.edu/policy/policy-resources/summaryai-provisions-national-defense-authorization-act-2021 [https://perma.cc/WNH4-M3XQ] (discussing
Section 5301 of the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act).
292 See Solow-Niederman, supra note 144, at 693 (2020) (arguing that “public actors can and should
place a greater emphasis on the ‘non-technical’ standards . . . that ‘inform policy and human decisionmaking.’” (quoting NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. LEADERSHIP IN AI: A PLAN FOR FEDERAL
ENGAGEMENT IN DEVELOPING TECHNICAL STANDARDS AND RELATED TOOLS 13 (2019))).
293 Id. at 675–80 (describing the resource imbalances between public and private players in the
context of AI development).
294 See Frank Pasquale, Data-Informed Duties in AI Development, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1917, 1920
(2019).
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CONCLUSION
The inference economy challenges information privacy. That’s because
information privacy protections rely on linear, control-centered frameworks
that ask for individual consent and then open or close dataflows based on
that consent. But information flows do not start and end with one person’s
control over their personal data. Seemingly innocuous or irrelevant data can
generate ML insights, making it impossible for an individual to predict what
kinds of data are important to protect. Moreover, it is possible to aggregate
myriad individuals’ data within ML models, identify patterns, and then apply
those patterns to make probabilistic inferences about other people. As a
result, what matters today is not just one individual’s control over their
personal, identifiable information. It’s not even clear that the category “their
personal, identifiable information” is the right one on which to focus in a
world where aggregated data that is neither personal nor identifiable can be
used to make inferences about you, me, and others. Our world features an
altogether different epistemic pathway from data to information to
knowledge.
The contemporary reality is an inference economy. The inference
economy consists of a network of relationships to manage—not a set of
dataflows for individuals to constrain. Preserving information privacy
protection today requires recognizing a historically overlooked relationship
that machine learning makes particularly salient: the connections between
those who access and amass data and those who subsequently process it to
draw inferences. Rather than double down on unresponsive, control-centered
tactics, a better strategy is to focus on the relationships that emerge in a more
complex, triangular model of data subjects, data collectors, and information
processors, and to develop regulatory interventions with an eye to who has
amassed informational power at each leg of the triangle, how they have done
so, and to what effect they use the data. Privacy protection in the inference
economy requires confronting which organizations have capabilities and
incentives to do things with data. We ignore that at our peril.
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